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G6th Congress"! SENATE /Document 

1st Session J \ No. 76 



TREATY OF PEACE 
WITH GERMANY 

REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN 
MEMBERS OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS AND THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 

AT THE WHITE HOUSE 

TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1919 




PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE 
August 20, 1919. — Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



0. of J. 

SEP 12 1919 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 



TUESDAY, AUGUST 19, 1919. 

United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 

Washington, D. C. 

conference at the white house. 

The committee met at the White House at 10 o'clock a. m., pur- 
suant to the invitation of the President, and proceeded to the East 
Room, where the conference was held. 

Present: Hon. Woodi'ow Wilson, President of the United States, 
and the following members of the, committee : Senators Lodge (chair- 
man), McCumber, Borah, Brandegee, Fall, Knox, Harding, Johnson, 
of California, New, Moses, Hitchcock, Williams, Swanson, Pomerene, 
Smith, and Pittman. 

STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT. 

The President. Mr. Chairman, I have taken the liberty of writing 
out a little statement in the hope that it might facilitate discussion 
by speaking directly on some points that I know have been points of 
controversy and upon which I thought an expression of opinion 
would not be unwelcome. I am absolutely glad that the committee 
should have responded in this way to my intimation that I would like 
to be of service to it. I welcome the opportunity for a frank and full 
interchange of views. 

I hope, too, that this conference will serve to expedite your con- 
sideration of the treaty of peace. I beg that you will pardon and 
indulge me if I again urge that practically the whole task of bringing 
the country back to normal conditions of life and industry waits upon 
the decision of the Senate with regard to the terms of the peace. 

I venture thus again to urge my advice that the action of the 
Senate with regard to the treaty be taken at the earliest practicable 
moment because the problems with which we are face to face in the 
readjustment of our national life are of the most pressing and critical 
character, will require for their proper solution the most intimate 
and disinterested cooperation of all parties and all interests, and can 
not be postponed without manifest peril to our people and to all the 
national advantages we hold most dear. May I mention a few of 
the matters which can not be handled with intelligence until the 
country knows the character of the peace it is to have? I do so only, 
by a very few samples. 

3 



4 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

The copper mines of Montana, Arizona, and Alaska, for example, 
are being kept open and in operation only at a great cost and loss, in 
part upon borrowed money; the zinc mines of Missouri, Tennessee, 
and Wisconsin are being operated at about one-half their capacity; 
the lead of Idaho, Illinois, and Missouri reaches only a portion of its 
former market; there is an immediate need for cotton belting, and 
also for lubricating oil, which can not be met — all because the channels 
of trade are barred by war when there is no war. The same is true 
of raw cotton, of which the Central Empires alone formerly purchased 
nearly 4,000,000 bales. And these are only examples. There is 
hardly a single raw material, a single important foodstuff, a single 
class of manufactured goods which is not in the same case. Our full, 
normal profitable production waits on peace. 

Our military plans of course wait upon it. We can not intelligently 
or wisely decide how large a naval or military force we shall maintain 
or what our policy with regard to military training is to be until we 
have peace not only, but also until we know how peace is to be 
sustained, whether by the arms of single nations or by the concert 
of all the great peoples. And there is more than that difficulty 
involved. The vast surplus properties of the Army include not food 
and clothing merely, whose sale will affect normal production, but 
great manufacturing establishments also which should be restored to 
their former uses, great stores of machine tools, and all sorts of 
merchandise which must lie idle until peace and military policy are 
definitively determined. By the same token there can be no properly 
studied national budget until then. 

The nations that ratify the treaty, such as Great Britain, Belgium, 
and France, will be in a position to lay their plans for controlling the 
markets of central Europe without competition from us if we do not 
presently act. We have no consular agents, no trade representatives 
there to look after our interests. 

There are large areas of Europe whose future will lie uncertain and 
questionable until their people know the final settlements of peace 
and the forces which are to administer and sustain it. Without 
determinate markets our production can not proceed with intelligence 
or confidence. There can be no stabilization of wages because there 
can be no settled conditions of emplo3^ment. There can be no easy 
or normal industrial credits because there can be no confident or 
permanent revival of business. 

But I will not weary you with obvious exam])les. I will only 
venture to repeat that every element of normal life amongst us 
depends upon and awaits the ratification of the treaty of peace ; and 
also that we can not afford to lose a single summer's day by not doing 
all that we can to mitigate the winter's suffering, which, unless we 
find means to prevent it, may prove disastrous to a large portion of 
the world, and may, at its worst, bring upon Europe conditions even 
more terrible than those wrought by the war itself. 

Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of 
■ the treaty except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and impli- 
cation of certain articles of the covenant of the league of nations ; and 
I must frankly say that I am unable to understand why such doubts 
should be entertained. You will recaU that when I had the pleasure 
of a conference with your committee and with the Committee of the 
House of Representatives on Foreign Affairs at the White House in 
March last the questions now most frequently asked about the league 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 5 

of nations were all canvassed with a view to their immediate clari- 
fication. The covenant of the league was then in its first draft and 
subject to revision. It was pointed out that no express recognition 
was given to the Monroe doctrine; that it was not expressly pro- 
vided that the league should have no authority to act or to express 
a judgment on matters of domestic policy; that the right to with- 
draw from the league was not expressly recognized; and that the 
constitutional right of the Congress to determme all questions of 
peace and war was not sufficiently safeguarded. On my return to 
Paris all these matters were taken up again by the commission on 
the league of nations and every suggestion of the United States was 
accepted. 

The views of the United States with regard to the questions I. have 
mentioned had, in fact, already been accepted by the commission 
and there was supposed to be nothing inconsistent with them in the 
draft of the covenant first adopted — the draft which was the subject 
of our discussion in March — but no objection was made to saying 
explicitly in the text what all had supposed to be implicit in it. 
There was absolutely no doubt as to the meaning of any one of the 
resulting provisions of the covenant in the minds of those who par- 
ticipated in drafting them, and I respectfully submit that there is 
nothing vague or doubtful in their wording. 

The Monroe doctrine is expressly mentioned as an understanding 
which is in no way to be impaired or interfered with by anything 
contained in the covenant and the expression "regional understand- 
ings like the Monroe doctrine" was used, not because anyone of the 
conferees thought there was any comparable agreement anywhere else 
in existence or in contemplation, but only because it was thought 
best to avoid the appearance of dealing in such a document with 
the policy of a single nation. Absolutely nothing is concealed 
in the phrase. 

With regard to domestic questions article 16 of the covenant 
expressly provides that, if in case of any dispute arising between 
members of the league the matter involved is claimed by one of the 
parties ' ' and is found by the council to arise out of a matter which 
by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that 
party, the council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation 
as to its settlement." The United States was by no means the only 
Government interested in the explicit adoption of this provision, and 
there is no doubt in the mind of any authoritative student of inter- 
national law that such matters as immigration, tariffs, and naturaliza- 
tion are incontestably domestic questions with which no international 
body could deal without express authority to do so. No enumeration 
of domestic questions was undertaken because to undertake it, 
even by sample, would have involved the danger of seeming to 
exclude those not mentioned. 

The right of any sovereign State to withdraw had been taken for 
granted, but no objection was made to making it explicit. Indeed, 
so soon as the views expressed at the White House conference were 
laid before the commission it was at once conceded that it was best 
not to leave the answer to so important a question to inference. No 
proposal was made to set up any tribunal to pass judgment upon the 
question whether a withdrawing nation had in fact fulfilled "all its 
international obligations and all its obligations under the covenant." 



6 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

It was recognized that that question must be left to be resolved by 
the conscience of the nation proposing to withdraw; and I must say 
that it did not seem to me worth while to propose that the article 
be made more explicit, because I knew that the United States would 
never itself propose to withdraw from the league if its conscience 
was not entirely clear as to the fulfillment of all its international 
obligations. It has never failed to fulfill them and never will. 

Article 10 is in no respect of doubtful meaning when read in the 
light of the covenant as a whole. The council of the league can only 
''advise upon" the means by which the obligations of that great 
article are to be given effect to. Unless the United States is a party 
to the policy or action in question, her own affirmative vote in the 
council is necessary before any advice can be given, for a unanimous 
vote of the council is required. If she is a party, the trouble is hers 
anyhow. And the unanimous vote of the council is only advice in 
any case. Each Government is free to reject it if it pleases. Nothing 
could have been made more clear to the conference than the right of 
our Congress under our Constitution to exercise its independent 
judgment in all matters of peace and war. No attempt was made to 
question or limit that right. The United States will, indeed, under- 
take under article 10 to "respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence 
of all members of the league," and that engagement constitutes a 
very grave and solemn moral obligation. But it is a moral, not a 
legal, obligation, and leaves our Congress absolutely free to put its 
own interpretation upon it in all cases that call for action. It is 
binding in conscience only, not in law. 

Article 10 seems to me to constitute the very backbone of the whole 
covenant. Without it the league would be hardly more than an 
influential debating society. 

It has several times been suggested, in public debate and in private 
conference, that interpretations of the sense in which the United 
States accepts the engagements of the covenant should be embodied 
in the instrument of ratification. There can be no reasonable objec- 
tion to such interpretations accompanying the act of ratification pro- 
vided they do not form a part of the formal ratification itself. Most 
of the interpretations which have been suggested to me embody what 
seems to me the plain meaning of the instrument itself. But if such 
interpretations should constitute a part of the formal resolution of 
ratification, long delays would be the inevitable consequence, inas- 
much as all the many governments concerned would have to accept, 
in eft'ect, the language of the Senate as the language of the treaty 
before ratification would be complete. Tlie assent of the German 
Assembly at Weimar would have to be obtained, among the rest, and 
I must frankly say that I could only with the greatest reluctance 
approach that assembly for permission to read the treaty as we 
understand it and as those who framed it quite certainly understood 
it. If the United States were to qualify the document in any way, 
moreover, I am confident from what I know of the many conferences 
and debates which accompanied the formulation of the treaty that 
our example would immediately be followed in many quarters, in 
some instances with very serious reservations, and that the meaning 
and operative force of the treatv would presently be clouded from 
one end of its clauses to the other. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 7 

Pardon me, Mr. Chairman, if I have been entirely unreserved and 
phiin-spoken in speaking of the great matters we all have so much at 
heart. If excuse is needed, I trust that the critical situation of 
affairs may serve as my justification, Tlie issues that manifestly 
hang upon the conclusions of the Senate with regard to peace and 
upon the time of its action are so grave and so clearly insusceptible 
of being thrust on one side or postponed that I have felt it necessary 
in the public interest to make this urgent plea, and to make it as 
simply and as unreservedly as possible. 

I thought that the simplest way, Mr. Chairman, to cover the points 
that I knew to be points of interest? 

The Chairman. Mr. President, so far as I am personally con- 
cerned — and I think I represent perhaps the majority of the com- 
mittee in that respect — ^we have no thought of entermg upon argu- 
ment as to interpretations or points of that character; but the 
committee is very desirous of getting information on certain points 
which seem not clear and on which they thought information would 
be of value to them in the consideration of the treaty which they, I 
think I may say for myself and .others, desire to hasten in every 
possible way. 

Your reference to the necessity of action leads me to ask one 
question. If we have to restore peace to the world it is necessary, I 
assume, that there should be treaties with Austria, Hungary, Turkey, 
and Bulgaria. Those treaties are aU more or less connected with the 
treaty with Gennany. The question I should like to ask is, what 
the prospect is of our receiving those treaties for action ? 

The President. I think it is very good, sir, and, so far as I can 
judge from the contents of the dispatches from my colleagues on the 
other side of the water, the chief delay is due to the uncertainty as 
to what is going to happen to this treaty. This treaty is the model 
for the others. I saw enough of the others before I left Paris to 
know that they are being framed upon the same set of principles and 
that the treaty with Germany is the model. I think that is the chief 
element of delay, sir. 

The Chairman. They are not regarded as essential to the con- 
sideration of this treaty? 

The President. They are not regarded as such; no, sir; they 
follow this treaty. 

The Chairman. I do not know about the other treaties, but the 
treaty with Poland, for example, has been completed ? 

The President. Yes, and signed; but it is dependent on this 
treaty. My thought was to submit it upon the action on this treaty. 

The Chairman. I should like, if I may, to ask a question in regard 
to the plans submitted to the commission on the league of nations, if 
that is the right phrase. 

The President. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You were kind enough to send us the draft of the 
American plan. When we were here in February, if I understood 
you rightly — I may be incorrect but I understood you to say that 
there were other clrafts or plans submitted by Great Britain, by 
France, and by Italy. Would it be possible for us to see those other 
tentative plans ? 

The President. I would have sent them to the committee with 
pleasure, Senator, if I had found that I had them. I took it for 



8 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

granted that I had them, but the papers that remain in my hands 
remain there in a haphazard way. I can tell you the character of the 
other drafts. The British draft was the only one, as I remember, 
that was in the form of a definite constitution of a league. The 
French and Italian drafts were in the form of a series of propositions 
laying down general rules and assuming that the commission, or 
whatever body made the final formulation, would build upon those 
principles if they were adopted. They were principles quite con- 
sistent with the final action. 

I remember saying to the committee when i was here in March — 
I hare forgotten the expression I used — something to the effect 
that the British draft had constituted the basis. 1 thought after- 
wards that that was misleading, and I am very glad to tell the com- 
mittee just what I meant. 

Some months before the conference assembled, apian for the league 
of nations had been drawn up by a British committee, at the head 
of which was Mr. Phillimore — I beheve the Mr. Phillimore who was 
known as an authority on international law. A copy of that docu- 
ment was sent to me, and I built upon that a redraft. I wiU not 
now say whether I thought it was better or not an improvement; but 
I built on that a draft which was quite different, inasmuch as it 
put definiteness where there had been what seemed indefiniteness in 
the Phillimore suggestion. Then, between that time and the time 
of the formation of the commission on the league of nations, I had the 
advantage of seeing a paper by Gen. Smuts, of South Africa, who 
seemed to me to have done some very clear thinking, particularly 
with regard to what was to be done with the pieces of the dismembered 
empires. After I got to Paris, therefore, I rewrote the docmuent to 
which I have alluded, and you may have noticed that it consists of a 
series of articles and then supplementary agreements. It was in the 
supplementary agreements that I embodied the additional ideas that 
had come to me not only from Gen. Smuts's paper but from other 
discussions. That is the fuU story of how the plan which I sent to 
the committee was built up. 

The Chairman. Of course, it is obvious that the Gen. Smuts plan 
has been used. That appears on the face of the document. 

The President. Yes. 

The Chairman. Then there was a previous draft in addition to 
the one you have sent to us? You spoke of a redraft. The original 
draft was not submitted to the committee? 

The President. No; that was privately, my own. 

The Chairman. Was it before our commission? 

The President. No: it was not before our commission. 

The Chairman. The one that was sent to us was a redraft of that? 

The President. Yes, I was reading some of the discussion before 
the committee, and some one, I think Senator Borah, if I remember 
correctly, quoted an early version of article 10. 

Senator Borah. That was Senator Johnson. 

Senator Johnson of California. I took it from the Independent. 

The President. I do not know how that was obtained, but that 
was part of the draft which preceded the draft which I sent to you. 

Senator Johnson of California. It was first published b,v Mr. Ham- 
ilton Holt in the Independent; it was again subsequently published 
in the New Republic, and from one of those publications I read it 
when examining, I think, the Secretary ol State. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY, <> 

The President. I read it with the greatest interest, because I had 
forgotten it, to tell the truth, but I recognized it as soon as I read it. 

Senator Joiinsox of California. It was the original plan ? 

The President. It was the original form of article 10; yes. 

The Chairman. I was about to ask in regard to article 10, as tho 
essence of it appears in article 2 of the draft which you sent, whether 
that was in the British plan — the Smuts plan — ^or the other plans ? 

Of course if there are no drafts of these other plans, we can not get 
them. 

The President. I am very sorrj^, Senator. I thought I had them^ 
but I have not. 

The Chairman. Mr. Lansing,' the Secretary of State, testified 
before us the other day that he had prepared a set of resolutions 
covering the pomts in the league, which was submitted to thes^ 
American commission. You saw that draft? 

The President. Yes. 

The Chairman. No specific action was taken upon it ? 

The President. Not m a formal way. 

The Chairman. Mr. President, I have no prepared set of questions,, 
but there are one or two that I wish to ask, ancl will go to an entirely 
different subject in my next question. I desire to ask purely for 
information. Is it intended that the United States shall receive any 
part of the reparation fund which is in the hands of the reparation 
commission ? 

The President. I left that question open. Senator, because I did 
not feel that I had any final right to decide it. Upon the basis that 
was set up in the reparation clauses the portion that the United 
States would receive would be very small at best, and my own judg- 
ment was frequently expressed, not as a decisicm but as a judgment, 
that we should claim nothmg under those general clauses. I did that 
because I coveted the moral advantage that that would give us in tho 
counsels of the world. 

Senator McCumber. Did that mean we would claim nothing for 
the sinking of the Lusitaniaf 

The President. Oh, no. That did not cover ciuestions of that 
sort at all. 

The Chairman. I understood that prewar claims were not covered 
by that reparation clause. 

The President. That is correct. 

The Chairman. I asked that c[uestion because I desired to know 
whether under the reparation commission there was anything ex- 
pected to come to us. 

The President. As I say, that remains to be decided. 

The Chairman. By the commission? 

The President. By the commission. 

The Chairman. Going now onto another c[ucstion, as I understand 
the treaty the overseas possessions of Germany are all made over to 
the five principal allied and associated powers, who apparently, as 
far as the treaty goes, have power to make disposition of them, I 
suppose by way of mandate or otherwise. Among those overseas 
possessions are the Ladrone Islands, except Guam, the Carolines, 
and, I think, the Marshall Islands. Has there been any recommen- 
dation made by our naval authorities in regard to the importance of 
our having one island there, not for territorial purposes, but for naval 
purposes ? 

S. Doc. 76, 66-1-^2 



10 TKEATY or PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

The President. There was a paper on that subject, Senator, 
which has been pubhshed. I only partially remember it. It was a 
]:)aper laying out the general necessities of our naval policy in the 
Pacific, ancl the necessity of having some base for communication 
upon those islands was mentioned, just in what form I do not remem- 
ber. But let me say this, there is a little island which I must admit 
I had not heard of before. 

wSenator Williams. The island of Yap ? 

The President. Yap. It is one of the bases and centers of cable 
and radio communication on the Pacific, and I made the point that 
the disposition, or rather the control, of that island should be re- 
served for the general conference which is to be held in regard to the 
ownership and operation of the cables. That subject is mentioned 
-and disposed of in this treaty and that general cable conference is to 
be held. 

The Chairman. I had understood, or I had heard the report, that 
our General Board of the Navy Department and our Chief of Operations, 
liad recommended that we should have a footing there, primarily in 
Older to secure cable communications. 

The President. T think you are right, sir. 

The Chairman. That we were likely to be cut off from cable com- 
munication — that is, that the cables were likely to pass entirely into 
other hands — unless we had some station there, and it seemed to me 
a matter of such importance that I asked the question. 

I wish to ask this further question: There was a secret treaty 
between England and Japan in regard to Shantung; and in the corre- 
spondence with the British ambassador at Tokyo, when announcing 
the acquiescence of Great Britain in Japan's having the German rights 
in Shantung, the British ambassador added: 

It is, of course, understood that we are to have the islands south of the Equator and 
Japan to have the islands north of the Equator. 

If it should seem necessary for the safety of communication 
for this country that we should have a cable station there, would that 
secret treaty interfere with it ? 

The President. I think not, sir, in view of the stipulation that I 
made with regard to the c^uestion of construction by this cable con- 
vention. That note of the British ambassador was a part of the 
diplomatic correspondence covering that subject. 

The Chairman. That was what I understood. 

Senator Moses. Was the stipulation that that should be reserved 
for the consideration of the cable conference a formally signed 
protocol ? 

The President. No; it was not a formally signed protocol, but 
~we had a prolonged and interesting discussion on the subject, and 
nobody has any doubt as to what was agreed upon. 

The Chairman. I asked the question because it seemed to me a 
matter of great importance. 

The President. Yes; it is. 

The Chairman. As a matter of self-protection, it seemed on the 
face of it that the treaty would give the five principal allied and asso- 
ciated powers the authority to make such disposition as they saw 
fit of those islands, but I did not know whether the secret treaty 
would thwart that purpose. I have no further questions to ask, 
Mr. President. 



TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 11 

Senator Borah. Mr. President, if no one else desires to ask a 
question, I want, so far as I am individually concerned, to get a little 
clearer information with reference to the withdrawal clause in the 
league covenant. Who passes upon the question of the fullfilment 
of our international oliligations, upon the question whether a nation 
has fulfilled its international obligations ? 

The President. Nobody. 

Senator Borah. Does the council have anything to say about it ? 

The President. Nothing whatever. 

Senator Borah. Then if a country should give notice of withdrawal 
it would be the sole judge of whether or not it had fulfilled its inter- 
national obligations — its covenants — to the league ? 

The President. That is as I understand it. The only restraming 
influence would be the public opinion of the world. 

Senator Borah. Precisely; but if the United States should con- 
ceive that it had fulfilled its obligations, that question could not be 
referred to the council in any way, or the council could not be called 
into action. 

The President. No. 

Senator Borah. Then, as I understand, when the notice is given, 
the right to withdraw is unconditional ? 

The President. Well, when the notice is given it is conditional on 
the faith of the conscience of the withdrawing nation at the close of 
the two-year period. 

Senator Borah. Precisely; but it is unconditional so far as the 
legal right or the moral right is concerned. 

The President. That is my interpretation. 

Senator Borah. There is no moral obligation on the part of the 
United States to observe any suggestion made by the council? 

The President. Oh, no. 

Senator Borah. With reference to withdrawing? 

The President. There might be a moral obligation if that sugges- 
tion had weight, Senator, but there is no other obligation. 

Senator Borah. Any moral obligation which the United States 
would feel, would be one arising from its own sense of obligation? 

The President. Oh, certainly. 

Senator Borah. And not by reason of any suggestion by the 
council? 

The President. Certainly. 

Senator Borah. Then the idea which has prevailed in some quar- 
ters that the council would pass upon such obligation is an erroneous 
one, from your standpoint? 

The President. Yes; entirely. 

Senator Borah. And as I understand, of course, you are expressing 
the view which was entertained by the commission which drew the 
league ? 

The President. I am confident that that was the view. That view 
was not formulated, you understand, but I am confident that that 
was the view. 

Senator McCumber. May I ask a question right here ? Would 
there be any objection, then, to a reservation declaring that to be 
the understanding of the force of this section ? 

The President. Senator, as I indicated at the opening of our con- 
ference, this is my judgment about that: Only we can interpret a 



12 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

moral obligation. The legal obligation can be enforced by such ma- 
chinery as there is to enforce it. We are therefore at liberty to in- 
terpret the sense in which we undertake a moral obligation. What 
I feel very earnestly is that it would be a mistake to em.body that 
interpretation in the resolution of ratification, because then it would 
be necessary for other governments to act upon it. 

Senator JVIcCumber. If they all recognized at the time that this 
was the understanding and the construction that should be given to 
that portion of the treaty, would it be necessary for them to act on 
it again? 

The President. I think it would. Senator. 

Senator McCumber. Could they not accept it merely by acquies- 
cence? 

The President. My experience as a lawyer was not very long; 
but that experience would teach me that the language of a contract 
is always part of the debatable matter, and I can testify that in our 
discussions in the commission on the league of nations we did not 
discuss ideas half as much as we discussed phraseologies. 

Senator McCumber. But suppose, Mr. President, we should make 
a declaration of that kind, which would be in entire accord with your 
view of the understanding of all of the nations, and without further 
comment or action the nations should proceed to appoint their com- 
missions, and to act under this treaty, would not that be a clear 
acquiescence in our construction ? 

The President. Oh, it might be. Senator, but we would not 
know for a good many months whether they were going to act in 
that sense or not. There would have to be either explicit accjui- 
escence, or the elapsing of a long enough time for us to know whether 
they were imj^licitly acquiescing or not. 

Senator McCumber. 1 should suppose that when the treaty was 
signed, under present world conditions, all nations would proceed 
to act immediately under it. 

The President. In some inatters; yes. 

Senator Harding. Mr. President, assuming that your construc- 
tion of the withdrawal clause is the understanding of the formulating 
commission, why is the language making the proviso for the fulfill- 
ment of covenants put into the article? 

The President. Merely as an argument to the conscience of the 
nations. In other words, it is a notice served on them that their 
colleagues will expect that at the time they withdraw they will 
have fulfilled their obligations. 

Senator Harding. The language hardly seems to make that 
implication, because it expresslj says, 'Provided it has fulfilled its 
obligations." 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Harding. If it were a matter for the nation itself to 
judge, that is rather a far-fetched provision, is it not? 

The President. Well, you are illustrating my recent remark, 
Senator, that the phraseology is your difficulty, not the idea. The 
idea is undoubtedly what I have expressed. 

Senator Pittman. Mr. President, Senator McCumber has drawn 
out that it is your impression that the allied and associated powers 
have the same opinion of the construction of these so-called indefinite 
articles that you have. Is that construction also known and held 
by Germany ? 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 13 

The President. I have no means of knowing. 

Senator Pittman. Germany, then, has not expressed herself to the 
commission with regard to these mooted questions ? 

The President. No ; we have no expression from Germany about 
the league, except the expression of her very strong desire to be ad- 
mitted to it. 

Senator Pittman. And is it your opinion that if the language of 
the treaty were changed in the resolution of ratification, the consent 
of Germany to the change would also be essential? 

The President. Oh, undoubtedly. 

The Chairman. Mr. President, in that connection — I did not mean 
to ask another question — I take it there is no question whatever, 
under international law and practice, that an amendment to the text 
of a treat}^ must be submitted to every signatory, and must receive 
either their assent or their dissent. I "had supposed it had been the 
general diplomatic practice with regard to reservations — which apply 
only to the reserving power, and not to all the signatories, of course — 
that with regard to reservations it had been the general practice that 
silence was regarded as acceptance and acquiescence; that there was 
that distinction between a textual amendment, which changed the 
treaty for every signatory, and a reservation, which changed it only 
for the reserving power. In that I may be mistaken, however. 

The President. There is some difference of opinion among the 
authorities, I am informed. I have not had time to look them up 
myself about that; but it is clear to me that in a treaty which involves 
so many signatories, a series of reservations — which would ensue, 
undoubtedly — would very much obscure our confident opinion as to 
how the treaty was going to work. 

Senator Williams. Mi*. President, suppose for example that we 
adopted a reservation, as the Senator from Massachusetts calls it, 
and that Germany did nothing about it at all, and afterwards con- 
tended that so far as that was concerned it was new matter, to which 
she was never a party: Could her position be justifiably disputed? 

Tlie President. No. 

Senator Borah. Mr. President, with reference to article 10 — you 
will observe that I am more interested in the league than any other 
feature of this discussion — in listening to the reading of your state- 
ment I got the impx'ession that your view was that the first obligation 
of article 10, to wit — - 

The members of the league undertake to respect and preserve as against external 
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members 
of the league — 

was simply a moral obligation. 

The President. Yes, sir; inasmuch as there is no sanction in the 
treaty. 

Senator Borah. But that would be a legal obligation so far as the 
United States was concerned if it should enter into it; would it not? 

The President. I would not interpret it in that way, Senator, 
because there is involved the element of judgment as to whether the 
territorial integrity or existing political independence is invaded or 
impaired. In other words, it is an attitude of comradeship and 
protection among the members of the league, which in its very 
nature is moral and not legal. 



14 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Borah. If, however, the actual fact of mvasion were 
beyond dispute, then the legal obligation, it seems to me, would 
immediately arise. I am simply throwing this out in order to get a 
full expression of views. The legal obligation would immediately 
arise if the fact of actual invasion were undisputed ? 

The President. The legal obligation to apply the automatic 
punishments of the covenant, undoubtedly; but not the legal obliga- 
tion to go to arms and actually to make war. Not the legal obligation. 
There might be a very strong moral obligation. 

Senator McCuiviber. Just so that I may understand definitely 
what your view is on that subject, Mr. President, do I understand 
you to mean that while we have two different remedies, and possibly 
others, we would be the sole judge of the remedy we would apply, 
but the obligation would still rest upon us to apply some remedy to 
bring about the result? 

The President. Yes. I can not quite accept the full wording 
that you used, sir. We would have complete freedom of choice as 
to the application of force. 

Senator McCumber. Would we not have the same freedom of 
choice as to whether we would apply a commercial boycott? Are 
they not both under the same language, so that we would be bound 
by them in the same way ? 

The President. Only in regard to certain articles. The breach 
of certain articles of the covenant does bring on what I have desig- 
nated as an automatic boycott, and in that we would have no choice. 

Senator Knox. Mr. President, allow me to ask this question: 
Suppose that it is perfectly obvious and accepted that there is an 
external aggression against some power, and suppose it is perfectly 
obvious and accepted that it can not be repelled except by force of 
arms, would we be under any legal obligation to participate? 

The President. No, sir; but we would be under an absolutely 
compelling moral obligation. 

Senator Knox. But no legal obligation ? 

The President. Not as I contemplate it. 

Senator Williams. Mr. President, each nation, if I understand it, 
is, of course, left to judge the applicability of the principles stated to 
the facts in the case, whether there is or is not external aggression? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Williams. And if any country should conclude that there 
was not external aggression, but that France or some other country 
had started the trouble indirectlv, we would have the same right, if 
I understand it, that Italy had to declare that her alliance with 
Germany and Austria was purely defensive, and that she did not see 
anything defensive in it; so when you come to judgment of the facts, 
outside of the international law involved, each nation must determine, 
if I understand, whether or not there has been external aggression? 

The President. I think you are right, sir. Senator [acldressing 
Senator Knox], you were about to ask something? 

Senator Knox. I only wanted to tell you that I asked that cjues- 
tion because I was a little confused by the language of your message 
transmitting the proposed Franco-American treaty to the Senate, in 
which you said, in substance, and, I think, practically in these 
terms, that this is only bindmg us to do immediately what we other- 
wise would have been bound to do under the league of nations ? 

The President. Yes. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 15 

Senator Knox. Perhaps I am mistaken with respect to its having- 
been in that message. I am sure I am mistaken ; it was not in that 
message ; it was in the message that Mr. Tumulty gave out 

The Chairman. May 10. 

Senator Knox. Yes. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Knox. That it was merely binding us to do immediately, 
without waiting for any other power, that which we would otherwise 
have been bound to do under the terms of the league of nations. 

The President. I did not use the word "bound," but ''morally 
bound." Let me say that you are repeating what I said to the other 
representatives. I said, "Of course, it is understood we would 
have to be convinced that it was an unprovoked movement of 
aggression/' and they at once acquiesced in that. 

Senator McCumber. Mr. President, there are a number of Senators 
who sincerely believe that under the construction of article 10, 
taken in connection with other clauses and other articles in the 
treaty, the council can suggest what we should do, and of course, 
while they admit the council can only advise and suggest, that it is 
nevertheless our moral duty to iilimediately obe}^ the council, with- 
out exercising our own judgment as to whether we shall go to war 
or otherwise. Now, the public, the American people, a great pro- 
portion of them, have that same conviction, which is contrary to 
your view. Do you not think, therefore, that it would be well 
to have a reservation inserted in our resolution that shall so construe 
that section as to make it clear, not only to the American people 
but to the world, that Congress may use its own judgment as to 
waat it will do, and that its failure to follow the judgment of the 
council will not be considered a breach of the agreement? 

The President. We differ. Senator, only as to the form of action. 
I think it would be a very serious practical mistake to put it in the 
resolution of ratification; but I do hope that we are at liberty, con- 
temporaneously with our acceptance of the treaty, to interpret our 
moral obligation under that article. 

Senator Pittman. Mr. President, I understand that, under the 
former method, in your opinion, it would have to go back to Germany 
and the other countries; while under the latter method it would 
not be required to go back for ratification. 

The President. Yes, sir; that is my judgment. 

Senator Knox. Mr. President, is it not true that such matters are 
ordinarily covered by a mere exchange of notes between powers, 
stating that they understand in this or that sense, or do not so 
understand ? 

The President. Yes, sir; ordinarily. 

Senator Knox. That would be a matter that would require very 
little time to consummate it, if these constructions have already been 
placed upon it in their conversations with you. 

The President. But an exchange of notes is quite a different 
matter from having it embodied in the resolution of ratification. 

Senator Knox. If we embody in our resolution of ratification a> 
statement that we understand section 10 or section 16 or section 
something else in a particular sense, and this Government, through 
its foreign department, transmits the proposed form of ratificatioa 
to the chancellors of the other nations that are concerned in this. 



16 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

treaty, and if those interpretations are the same as you have ao;reed 
upon" with them in your conversations, I do not see how we would 
need anything more than a mere reply to that effect. 

The President. It would need confirmation. 

Senator Knox. Yes; it would need confirmation in that sense. 

The President. My judgment is that the embodying of that in the 
terms of the resolution of ratification would be acquiescence not only 
in the interpretation but in the very phraseologv of the interpreta- 
tion, because it would form a part of the contract. 

Senator Knox. It might with us, because w^e have so much m'l- 
chinery for dealing with treaties, but in other countries where it is 
much more simple I should think it would no<^ be. 

The President. It is simple legally, Senator; but, for example, 
this treaty has been submitted to legislatures to which the Govern- 
ment was not, by law, obliged to submit it, and it is everywhere 
being treated as a legislative matter — I mean, so far as the ratifica- 
tion is concerned. 

Senator Knox. You mean in countries where, under their consti- 
tutions, there are provisions that treaties ordinarily are not sub- 
mitted to the legislative branch of the Government, this treaty is 
being so submitted ? 

The President. So I understand. 

Senator Knox. Where there are two branches of the legislative 
department, an upper and a lower branch, do you laiow whether it is 
being submitted to both ? 

The President. I thmk not, sir. I am not certain about that; 
but my memory is it is not. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, the idea has struck me and I have 
entertained the view, since reading the treaty and the league, that 
Germany having signed the treaty but not being yet a member of the 
league, any reservations which we might make here would be met by 
Germany either joming the league or refusing to join the league. 
It would not be submitted to her at all now, because she is not a 
member of the league ? You catch the point ? 

The President. Yes. I differ with you there, Senator. One of 
the reasons for putting the league m the treaty was that Germany 
was not gomg to be admitted to the league immediately, and we felt 
that it was very necessary that we should get her acknowledgment — 
acceptance — of the league as an international authority, partly 
because we were excluding her, so that she would thereafter have no 
ground for questioning such authority as the league might exercise 
under its covenant. 

Senator Fall. Precisely. 

The President. Therefore, I think it would be necessary for her to 
acquiesce in a league the powers of which were differently construed. 

Senator Fall. Precisely; but her acquiescence would be by her 
accepting the invitation, when extended, either to join the league or 
not to join the league. In other words, upon ratification by three of 
the powers, a status of peace is established, and as to those three 
powers and Germany all the rules and regulations contained in the 
treaty of peace become operative. As to the other nations which 
have not ratified, the status of peace exists; that is, war has termi- 
nated. Now, that being the case, and Germany being out of the 
league — not having been invited to join the league — if in ratifying the 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 17 

treaty we ratify it with certtiin explanatiors or reservations, even in 
the ratifying resohition, when the time comes and Germany is 
invited to become a member of the league, or when she apphes, under 
the admission chiuse of the league, for membership therein, if she 
enters she of course accepts our reservations. If she makes a 
qualified application, then it is for the league itself to consider 
whether she will be admitted? 

The President. I do not follow your reasoning in the matter, 
Senator, because this is not merely a question of either membership or 
nonmembership. The covenant is a part of the treaty, it is a part 
of the treaty which she has signed, and we are not at liberty to change 
any part of that treaty without the acquiescence of the other con- 
tracting party. 

Senator Fall. Well, Mr. President, of course it is not my purpose 
to enter into an argument, but we are here for information. There 
are provisions for the amendment of the articles. Germany is out of 
the league. Any amendment proposed by the other members of the 
league prior to her coming into the league would not be submitted 
to her, would it, she not being a member? 

The President. I will admit that that point had not occurred to 
me. No, she would not. 

Senator Fall. Then so far as we are concerned we could make a 
recommendation in the nature of an amendment. 

Senator Pittman. She has already agreed by this treaty that she 
has signed that the members may amend it. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Fall. Precisely, and we could come in with an amend- 
ment. 

Senator Hitchcock. Did I understand your first reply to Senator 
Fall to be that Germany under this treaty already had a relationship 
to the league by reason of its international character, and its participa- 
tion in a number of questions that Germany was interested in ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Hitchcock. So that it has a relationship to the league of 
nations even before the time that it may apply for membership. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator McCumber. Mr. President, you answered one question 
that I think possibly may need a little elucidation. If I remember 
rightly, in reference to reparation your statement was that the com- 
mission would have to decide whether the United States should 
claim her proportion of the reparation. 

The President. That the commission would have to do it? No; 
we decide whether we claim it or not. 

Senator McCumber. That is what I want to make clear. I think 
the question was asked if the commission was to decide that, and 
I thought your answer said yes. That is the reason I asked the 
question. 

The President. The claim would have to come from us, of course. 

Senator McCumber. It would have to be through an act of Con- 
gress, would it not? 

The President. I would have to be instructed about that. Senator. 
I do not know. 

S. Doc. 76, 66-1 3 



18 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator McCumber. Whatever right the United States would 
receive under the treaty for reparation or indemnity is one that runs 
to the United States, and therefore to divest ourselves of that right 
would require an act of Congress. 

The President. To divest ourselves of it? I suppose so. 

Senator Knox. In the question of the Japanese indemnity, that 
was done by a joint resolution. 

Senator McCuiviber. I thought the President said it would have to 
be decided by the constituted authority. 

Senator Knox. I did not understand that he said that. 

Senator Swanson. I understand that the reparation is to be 
decided upon a representation made by the associated powers. It 
would seem that the President under that agreement with France, 
Oreat Britain, and other nations would have to submit it to the Senate 
for ratification, and the agreement would have to be reported. 

Senator McCumber. In each case it would have the force of law. 

Senator Swanson. If the Senate wanted to ratify it, it would take 
an act of Congress. 

Senator Williams. Tliis question of reparation does not in any 
way aft'ect our rights to prewar indemnities'? 

The President. Tliat is expressly stated. 

Senator Williams. That is expressly stated. Now, then, one 
other question. Germany has signed this treaty with the covenant 
of the league in it, and she is subject to be dealt with as a nonmember 
under the treaty, and has very much fewer privileges than a member ? 

Tlie President. Yes. 

Senator New. Mi\ President, may I ask a question there? Wliat 
effort was made by the delegates there to prevent the proceedings of 
the reparations committee being required to be secret? 

The President. I beg your pardon. Senator. 

Senator New. What effort, if any, was made by the American 
delegates to prevent the proceedings of the reparation commission 
from being required to be secret, and did the American delegates 
protest that America be omitted from this commission on account of 
that thing ? 

The President. Nothing was said about it, that I remember. 

Senator Borah. Mr. President, coming back for a moment to the 
subject from which we were diverted a moment ago, and coupling 
with article 10 article 11, in order that we may have the construction 
of the cammittee which framed the league as to both of those articles, 
as I understand it from your statement, the committee's view was 
that the obligations under articles 10 and 11, whatever they are, 
are moral obligations. 

The President. Remind me of the eleventh. I do not remember 
that by number. 

Senator Borah (reading) : 

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members of the 
league or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole league, and the league 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace 
of nations. 

What I am particularly anxious to know is whether or not the con- 
struction which was placed upon these two articles by the committee 
which framed the league was that it was a binding obligation 
from a legal standpoint, or merely a moral obligation. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 19 

The President. Senator, I tried to answer with regard to article 10. 

Senator Borah. Yes; exactly. 

The President. I would apply it equally with regard to article 
11, though I ought to hasten to say that we did not formulate these 
interpretations. I can only speak from my confident impression 
from the debates that accompanied the formulation of the covenant. 

vSenator Borah. Yes; I understand; and your construction of 
article 11 is the same as that of article 10? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Borah. As to the question of legal obligation. That is 
all I desire to ask at present. 

Senator Harding. Right there, Mr. President, if there is nothing 
more than a moral obligation on the part of any member of the 
league, what avail articles 10 and 11 ? 

The President. Why, Senator, it is surprising that that question 
should be asked. If we undertake an obligation we are bound in 
the most solemn way to carry it out. 

Senator Harding. If you believe there is nothing more to this 
than a moral obligation, any nation will assume a moral obligation 
on its own account. Is it a moral obligation? The point I am 
trying to get at is, Suppose something arises affecting the peace of 
the world, and the council takes steps as provided here to conserve 
or preserve, and announces its decision, and every nation in the league 
takes advantage of the construction that you place upon these 
articles and says, ''Well, this is only a moral obligation, and we 
assume that the nation involved does not deserve our participation 
or protection," and the whole thing amounts to nothing but an 
expression of the league council. 

The President. There is a national good conscience in such a 
matter. I should think that was one of the most serious things 
that could possibly happen. When I speak of a legal obliga- 
tion, I mean one that specifically binds you to do a partic- 
ular thing under certain sanctions. That is a legal obligation. 
Now a moral obligation is of course superior to a legal obligation, 
and, if I may say so, has a greater bindmg force; only there always 
remains in the moral obligation the right to exercise one's judgment 
as to whether it is indeed incumbent upon one in those circumstances 
to do that thing. In every moral obligation there is an element of 
judgment. In a legal obligation there is no element of judgment. 

Senator Johnson of California. But, Mr. President, when a moral 
obligation is undoubted it will impel action more readily than a legal 
obligation. 

Tlie President. If it is undoubted, yes; but that involves the cir- 
cumstances of the particular case, Senator. 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes; necessarily. 

Senator PIarding. In answering Senator Knox a moment ago 
you spoke of a compelling moral obligation. Would you think that 
any less bindmg than a specific legal obligation ? 

The President. Not less binding, but operative in a different way 
because of the element of judgment. 

Senator Harding. But not less likely to involve us in armed 
participation ? 

The President. In trifling matters, s^ery much less likely. 



20 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Harding. To clear my slow mind, let me take a specific 
case. Suppose the allotted territory which comes mider the control 
of Italy should in some way be assailed from the Balkan States and 
the council of the league should immediately look upon that as a 
threat of war mvolying other nations and should say that the nations 
of the league should immediately contribute an armed force to stop 
that war or to bring the attacking nation to terms, would we be a 
perfidious people, if I may use that term, or would we violate our 
obligations, if we failed to participate in the defense of Italy? 

The President. We would be our own judges as to whether we 
were obliged m those circumstances to act m that way or not. 

Senator Hitchcock. In such a case the council would only act 
unanimously, and om- representative on the council of course would 
have to concur in any advice given. 

The President. Certainly; we would always in such case advise 
ourselves. 

Senator Williams. But if in such case, Mr. President, we concluded 
that the case provided for and prescribed had arisen and that the 
extraneous attack existed and that it fell within the terms of the 
treaty, then we would be untrue if we did not keep our word ? 

The President. Certainly. 

Senator Borah. In other words, then, that transfers the power to 
decide whether we should act from the Congress of the United States 
to one individual who sits on the council. 

Senator Williams. No, it does not; it- merely provides that when 
the council acts in accordance with the prescribed terms and we see 
that it has acted, then Congress will, as a matter of faith keeping, act 
itself; and, if Congress does not. Congress will do a dishonorable 
thing. 

Senator Borah. Precisely so; so that the matter gets back to the 
point where one individual has bound Congress. 

Senator Hitchcock. I hope my question to the President will not 
be interpreted in that way. My question to the President was 
whether the matter would even come before this country as the 
advice of the council until the American representative had con- 
curred with the other eight members of the council. After he had 
concurred it would then be up to Congress to decide. 

The President. You are quite right. Senator. And let me sug- 
gest that I find nothing was more clearly in the consciousness of the 
men who were discussing these very important matters than that 
most of the nations concerned had popular governments. They 
were all the time aware of the fact that it would depend upon the 
approving or disapproving state of opinion of their countries how 
their representatives in the council would vote in matters of this 
sort; and it is inconceivable to me that, unless the opinion of the 
United vStates, the moral and practical judgment of the people of 
the United States, approved, the representative of the United States 
on the council should vote any such advice as would lead us into war. 

Senator Borah. Mr. President, does the special alliance treaty with 
France which has been submitted to us rest upon any other basis as 
to legal and moral obligation than that of article 10 and article 11 
which you have just described ? 

The President. No, sir. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 21 

Senator Borah. That is also, as you understand it, simply our moral 
obligations which we enter into with France ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Williams. All international obligations are moral ones. 

Senator Pittman. There is one thing I do not understand about 
Senator Borah's question. He has stated that he gathers from what 
you said that it all rests with our representative on the council. 
Even if our representative on the council advises as a member of 
the council, and the council is unanimous, is it not then still up to 
Congress either to accept or reject that advice ? 

The President. Oh, yes; but I understood the Senator to mean 
that it would be dependent on our representative. 

Senator Johnson of California. May I take the example that was 
just suggested concerning the Balkan States and a possible attack upon 
the new territories of Italy. Assuming that that is a case of external 
aggression by the Balkan States concerning the new territory that 
Italy has acquired by the peace treaty, upon us rests a compelling 
moral obligation to do our part in preventing that, does there not? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Johnson of California: And that compelling moral obliga- 
tion would require us to use such means as would seem appropriate, 
either economic or force ? Is not that correct ? 

The President. Deemed appropriate by whom ? That is really 
the point. 

Senator Johnson of California. Of course, deemed appropriate for 
the purpose of preventing and frustrating the aggression. 

The President. Deemed by us appropriate? 

Senator Johnson of California. I assume of necessity it would have 
to be deemed by us to bind us as a compelling moral obligation to 
prevent the aggression in the case named. 

The President. Yes, 

Senator McCumber. Mr. President, I think, due to my own fault, 
I do not fully comprehend your distinction between a moral and a 
legal obligation in a treaty. If we enter into a treaty with France to 
defend her against aggression frorii Germany for any length of time, 
that is a legal obligation, is it not ? 

The President. Legal in the sense that a treaty is of binding force; 
yes. 

Senator McCumber. Yes; that is what I meant. It is as legal 
as any treaty could be made legal, and there is also a moral obligation 
to keep that treaty, is there not? 

The President. Yes, sir. I happened to hear Senator Knox say 
what I am glad to adopt. It is a legal obligation with a moral 
sanction. 

Senator Borah. That is true generally, is it not? 

The President. Yes, Senator; but I have already defined in what 
:3pecial sense I use the word "legal." 

Senator McCumber. To my mind those two articles are legal obli- 
gations to be carried out by the moral conscience of the American 
people if the conditions justify it. 

The President. You see we are speaking of two different fields, 
and therefore the language does not fit. In international law the 
word "legal" does not mean the same as in national law, and the word 
hardly applies. 



22 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Borah. I wish to ask some questions in regard to the secret 
treaties. I do not feel as free about those matters as I do about the 
league, because there are certain things that I recognize may not be 
entirely open for |3ublic consideration; but, nevertheless, in so far as 
we can, I should like to know when the first knowledge came to this 
Government with reference to the secret treaties between Japan, 
Great Britain, Italy, and France concerning the German possessions 
in Shantung. 

The President. I thought that Secretary Lansing had looked that 
up and told you. I can only reply from my own knowledge, and my 
own knowledge came after I reached Paris. 

Senator Borah. We did get a repl}^ from Mr. Lansing to the same 
effect so far as he was concerned. When did the secret treaties between 
Great Britain, France, and the other nations of Europe with reference 
to certain adjustments in Europe first come to your knowledge ? Was 
that after you had reached Paris also ? 

The President. Yes; the whole series of understandings were dis- 
closed to me for the first time then. 

Senator Borah. Then we had no knowledge of these secret treaties, 
so far as our Government was concerned, until you reached Paris ? 

The President. Not unless there was information at the State 
Department of which I knew nothing. 

Senator Borah. Do you know when the secret treaties between 
Japan, Great Britain, and other countries were first made known to 
China? 

The President. No, sir; I do not. I remember a meeting of what 
was popularly called the council of ten, after our reaching Paris, in 
which it was first suggested that all these understandings should be 
laid upon the table of the conference. That was some time after we 
reached there, and I do not know whether that was China's fu'st 
knowledge of these matters or not. 

Senator Borah. Would it be proper for me to ask if Great Britain 
and France insisted upon maintaining these secret treaties at the 
peace conference as they were made ? 

The President. I think it is proper for me to answer that question, 
sir. I will put it in this way: They felt that they could not recede 
from them, that is to say, that they were bound by them, but when 
they involved general interests such as they realized were involved, 
they were quite willing, and indeed I think desirous, that they should 
be reconsidered with the consent of the other parties. I mean with 
the consent, so far as they were concerned, of the other parties. 

Senator Moses. Were all those treaties then produced, Mi". Presi- 
dent? 

The President. Oh, yes. 

Senator Moses. Did that include the seciet arrangement with ref- 
erence to Avion a ? 

The President. I do not recall that agreement, Senator. You 
mean with regard to Italy having Avlona? 

Senator Moses. Yes. 

The President. If it did, I did not see it. I heard of it, but I can 
not say confidently that the terms were laid before us. 

Senator Moses. I recall in some statements you made in connection 
with Fiume that you referred to Italy receiving Avlona under some 
agreement previously arrived at, and in that statement you held that 



TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 23 

to be part compensation at least for any loss she might sustain in not 
having Fiume. 

The President. I was referring to what I understood to he the 
agreement. I am simply now answering your question that I did 
not see that agreement in written terms. 

Senator Moses. Then, they were not produced in textual form? 

Tlie President. I do not know; they may have been and I may 
not have picked them up in the great mass of papei-s before me. 

Senator Moses. Tlie purpose of my inquiry was to ascertain 
whether there was laid before the council of ten any textual agree- 
ments which transferred parts of the territory of one independent 
nation to another. 

The President. Only those that have been spoken of. 

Senator Moses. That is to say, Shantung and Avlona? 

The President. I say only those that we have had under general 
discussion. I can not enumerate them, but there are none that have 
not been produced so far as I know. That answers the question. 

Senator McCumber. The secret treaties to which you refer are 
those treaties which were made from time to time as the exigencies 
of the war required during the period of the war? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator McCumber. And not treaties that were made prior to the 
war ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Williams. Mr. President, I wish to ask you a question 
in order to see if the facts are 3lear in my own mind. As I understand 
the situation — and I should like to have you correct me if I am 
wrong — ^France and Great Britain both have stated that they were 
bound by certain treaties with Japan and fchey were perfectly willing, 
with Japan's consent, to reconsider those treaties, but that they 
were themselves bound if the other party to the treaty did not 
consent to reconsider. Is that about it ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Williams. That is what I thought. Bound in honor is 
the only way a nation is bound in international affairs. 

Senator Swanson. Can you tell us, or would it be proper to do 
so, of your understanding with Japan as to the return of Shantung? 
That is a question which has been very much discussed. 

The President. I have published the wording of the under- 
standing, Senator. I can not be confident that I quote it literally, 
but I know that I quote it in substance. It was that Japan should 
return to China in full sovereignty the old Province of Shantung so 
far as Germany had had any claims upon it, preserving to herself 
the right to establish a residential district at Tsingtao, which is the 
town of Kiaochow Bay; that with regard to the railwaj^s and mines 
she should retain only the rights of an economic concession there, 
with the right, however, to m.aintain a special body of ])olice on the 
railway, the personnel of which should be Chinese under Japanese 
instructors nominated by the managers of the company and appointed 
by the Chinese Government. I think that is the whole of it. 

Senator Pomerene. That is, that the instructors should be con- 
firmed by the Chinese Government ? 

The President. No; not exactly that. The language, as i re- 
member it, was that they should be nominated by the managers of 
the railway company, and appointed by the Chinese Government. 



24 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Borah. Was that understanding oral ? 

Senator Williams. This rather curious question presents itselfjto 
my mind: As T understand, Japan has retained sovereignty for the 99 
years of the lease only at Kiaochow, and 5 kilometers, or some such 
distance, back from the bay. 

The President. She has not retained sovereignty over anything. 

wSenator Williams. She has not ? 

The President. I mean, she has promised not to. 

wSenator Williams. During the period of the lease ? 

The President. Xo; she has promised not to retain sovereignty 
at all. Senator Borah asked whether this understanding was oral 
or otherwise. I do not like to describe the operation exactly if it is 
not perfectly discreet, but as a matter of fact this was technically oral, 
but literally written and formulated, and the formulation agreed upon. 

Senator Johnson of California. When, Mr. President, is the return 
to be made ? 

Tlie President. That was left undecided. Senator, but we were 
assured at the time that it would be as soon as possible. 

Senator Johnson of California. Did not the Japanese decline to 
fix any date ? 

The President. They did at that time, yes; but I think it is fair 
to them to say not in the spirit of those who wished it be within 
their choice, but simply that they could not at that time say when it 
would be. 

Senator Johnson of California. The economic privileges that they 
would retain would give them a fair mastery over the province, 
would they not, or at least the Chinese think so ? Let me put it 
in that fashion, please. 

The President. I believe they do. Senator. I do not feel qualified 
to judge. I should say that that was an exaggerated view. 

Senator Johnson of California. But the Chinese feel that way 
about it, and have so expressed themselves ? 

The President. They have so expressed themselves. 

Senator Knox. Mr. President, the economic privileges that they 
originall}^ acquired in Korea, and subsequently in inner and outer 
Mongolia, and in northern and southern Manchuria, have almost 
developed into a complete sovereignty over those countries, have 
they not ? 

The President. Yes, Senator; in the absence of a league of nations 
they have. 

Senator Knox. You think the league of nations would have pre- 
vented that, do you ? 

The President. I am confident it would. 

Senator New. Mr. President, does not this indefinite promise of 
Japan's suggest the somewhat analogous case of England's occupa- 
tion of Malta ? She has occupied Malta for something like a century, 
I believe, under a very similar promise. 

The President. Well, Senator, I hope you will pardon me if 1 
do not answer that question. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, speaking of the duty of defense in 
reference to sovereignty, and of aggression with reference to sover- 
eignt}', in construing these different articles of the league, I have been 
curious to know who will defend the mandate territories or colonies 
if there should be external aggression. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 25 

The President. Primarily, the mandatory power. 

Senator Fall. The mandatory power woiikl have that character 
of sovereignty over the possession which would compel it as a duty 
to defend the mandate province ? 

The President, Yes. 

Senator Fall. Then a qualified sovereignty would in that 
instance, at any rate, compel the mandatory of the league first to 
defend the colony ? 

The President. I should put it this way, Senator: We had in mind 
throughout the whole discussion of the mandate idea the analogy of 
trustees. The States taking those under mandates would be in the 
nature of trustees, and of course it is part of the trustee's duty to 
preserve intact the trust estate. 

Senator Fall. But out of the funds of the trust estate ? 

The President. Oh, yes. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, I will not pursue that line at this 
time. I will say very frankly that I have prepared some questions 
which I wanted, for my own purposes, to put down in writing, and 
I had expected to ask them in sequence of you after the other Senators 
had concluded. It will, however, evidently take quite a long while 
if we pursue the line which we are now pursuing, and particularly 
if the Senators themselves argue their own interpretations of the 
different clauses in the treaty. 

Senator McCutviber. Mr. President, I should like to get as definite 
an understanding as I can, at least, of how these promises of Japan 
to return Shantung are evidenced to-day. In what form do they 
appear ? 

The President. They are evidenced in a proces-verbal of the 
so-called council of four— the name that we ourselves used was very 
much more pretentious; we called ourselves the council of the princi- 
pal allied and associated powers — but the four who used to confer, 
or rather the five, because Japan was there of course at that time. 

Senator McCumber. The principal points were taken down in 
writing and read over and compared and preserved, were they? 

The President. Not read over and compared, but preserved. 
The process each day was this. Senator: The matters discussed were 
summarized, and the conclusions reached were recorded in a proces- 
verbal, copies of which were distributed within 24 hours; and of course 
it was open to any one of the conferees to correct anything they 
might contain. Only in that sense were they corrected. 

Senator McCumber. Where are those records kept now ? 

The President. They are in Paris, sir. 

Senator McCumber. Is there any objection to their being produced 
for the committee ? 

The President. I think there is a very serious objection, Senator. 
The reason we constituted that very small conference was so that we 
could speak with the utmost absence of restraint, and I think it 
would be a mistake to make use of those discussions outside. I do 
not remember any blazing indiscretion of my own, but there may 
be some. 

Senator McCumber. In those conversations it was fully understood 
that Japan was to return Shantung as soon as possible ? 

The President. Yes, sir. 
S. Doc. 76, 66-1 4 



26 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator McCumber. Was there anything stated as to what was 
meant by ''as soon as possible'^ — that is, to place it within any 
definite period at all? 

The President. No, sir; no. We relied on Japan's good faith 
in fulfilling that promise. 

Senator McCumber. Was there anything outside? If I go too 
far in my questions you can signify it, Mr. President. 

The President. How do you mean outside, Senator? 

Senator McCumber. Was there anything said by Japan as to 
anything that she would want to do before she turned the territory 
over to China ? 

The President. No; nothing was mentioned. 

Senator McCumber. Then "as soon as possible" would naturally 
mean, would it not, as soon as the treaty has been signed under 
which she accepts the transfer from Germany ? 

The President. Well, I should say that it would mean that the 
process should begin then. Of course there would be many practical 
considerations of which I know nothing that might prolong the 
process. 

Senator McCumber. And all that Japan reserves is the same that 
other great nations have reserved — certain concessions? 

The President. A residential concession and economic conces- 
sions; yes, sir. 

Senator McCumber. The same as Great Britain and France and 
other countries have retained there ? 

The President. Yes; and I ought to say that the representatives 
of Japan showed every evidence of wishing to put the matter upon 
just the same basis that the dealings of other nations with China 
have rested upon for some time. 

Senator McCumber. The whole purpose of my question, Mr. 
President, is to satisfy my mind, if I can, that Japan will in good 
faith carry out her agreement. 

The President. I have every confidence that she will, sir. 

Senator Pomerene. Mr. President, if I may, I should like to ask 
a question or two along that same line. If this treaty should fail of 
ratification, then would not the opportunity be open to Japan to 
treat the Shantung question just as she has treated the Manchurian 
situation ? 

The President. I think so ; yes. 

Senator Pomerene. So that if the treaty should fail of ratifica- 
tion, China, so far as Shantung is concerned, would be practicaUy at 
the mercy of Japan; whereas if the treaty is ratified, then at least 
she will have the benefit of the moral assistance of all the other 
signatory powers to the treaty to aid in the protection of Chinese 
rights ? 

The President. Senator, I conceive one of the chief benefits of 
the whole arrangement that centers in the league of nations to be 
just what you have indicated — that it brings to bear the opinion of 
the world and the controlling action of the world on all relationships 
of that hazardous sort, particularly those relationships which involve 
the rights of the weaker nations. After all, the wars that are likely 
to come are most likely to come by aggression against the weaker 
nations. Without the league of nations they have no buttress or 
protection. With it, they have the united protection of the world; 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 27 

and inasmuch as it is the universal opinion that the great tragedy 
through which we have just passed never woukl have occurred if the 
Central Powers had dreamed that a number of nations would be 
combined against them, so I have the utmost confidence that this 
notice beforehand that the strong nations of the world will in every 
case be united will make war extremely unlikely. 

Senator Moses. Mr. President, are these proces verbaux to be 
deposited anywhere as a matter of public record ? 

The President. That had not been decided, Senator. Of course, 
if they were deposited as a matter of public record, there would be 
certain very great disadvantages. 

Senator Moses. Are they to be deposited with the secretariat of 
the league of nations ? 

The President. No, sir. 

Senator Moses. Without some such depository, how otherwise 
would this engagement of Japan, as embodied in the proces verbal, 
be brought forward for enforcement ? 

The President. There would be as many copies of the proces 
verbal as there were members of the conference in existence much 
longer than the time within which we shall learn whether Japan 
will fulfill her obligations or not. 

Senator Moses. You mean in the private papers of the personnel 
of the council of four ? 

The President. I would not call them private papers. I have a 
copy. Senator. I regard them as a public trust, not private papers, 
and I can assure you that they will not be destroyed. 

Senator Moses. Suppose that each member of the council of four 
had passed out of office, out of any position of power, at a time 
when it became evident that Japan was not keeping the engage- 
ment as it was embodied in the proces- verbal on the day when 
this record was made, in what manner would you expect that 
engagement to be brought forward for enforcement ? 

The President. I should deem it my duty — I can not speak for the 
others — to leave those papers where they could be made accessible. 

Senator Pomerene. Mr. President, I have another question or two 
on the Shantung proposition that I should like to ask, if I may. 

Assummg for the sake of the argument that there were to be some 
undue delay on the part of Japan in turning back to China her rights 
in Shantung, and that Chma were to make complaint to the council 
provided for in the league of nations, have you any doubt but that it 
would be taken up promptly by all the members of that council for 
their consideration and determmation ? 

The President. No, sir; I have not any doubt of it. 

Senator Pomerene. iVnother question: On yesterday Dr. Millard 
was before the committee, and he made the statement that there 
were twenty regional understandmgs similar to the Monroe doctrine. 
I desire to say, however, that in answer to a question 

The President. Did he name any of them ? 

Senator Pomerene. I asked him some questions afterwards, and in 
explanation he qualified that statement by saymg that these were 
written agreements somewhat akm to the Lansing-Ishii agreement, 
so-called, and as to these with relation to Chma a part of them were 
as between Japan and Chma, and a part as between Great Britaui 
and China; and he instanced the secret agreement with Japan respect- 



28 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

ing Shantung. What I desired to ask was this : Did any information 
come to the commission indicating that there were any regional 
understandings similar to the Monroe doctrine ? 

The President. None, whatever. The only agreements that I can 
imagine he was referring to are contained in the exchanges of notes 
which occurred between the Japanese and Chinese Governments in 
1915 and 1918 with regard to the method and conditions of the re- 
turn of Shantung Province to China. 

Senator Hitchcock. Mr. President, I think it should be said also 
that later on in his testimony, either in answer to a question by 
Senator Pomerene, or perhaps in response to a question by Senator 
Swanson, while the witness, Dr. Millard, stated that he deemed them 
regional understandings — those that he had in mind — ^he said very 
emphatically that they were totally unlike the Monroe doctrine, 
and would not come under that category. 

The President. And in his sense every treaty that concerns ter- 
ritory anywhere affects a region, and is a regional understanding; 
but that is a very broad and vague meaning to attach to the word. 

Senator Johnson of California. Mr. President, I am quite hesi- 
tant about asking certain questions which I wish to ask. I apol- 
ogize in advance for asking them, and I trust you will stop me at 
once if they are questions which you deem inappropriate, or that 
ought not to be asked. 

The President. Thank you. 

Senator Johnson of California. First, we have pending now treaties 
of peace with Austria, with Hungary, with Bulgaria, and with the 
Ottoman Empire, all of which involve tremendous new territorial 
adjustments; and under those new territorial adjustments we will 
have our obligations, moral or otherwise, under the league of nations, 
of course. The new territorial adjustments about to be determined 
upon in these various treaties are really greater in extent, or quite as 
important, at least, as those that are provided for by the German 
treaty; are they not ? 

The President. I should say so; yes. 

Senator Johnson of California. They will deal not only with the 
creation of the boundaries of new nations, but possibly with the 
subject of mandatories, too ? 

The President. Well, the treaties will not themselves deal with 
the mandatories. That is a matter that will be decided by the 
league. 

Senator Johnson of California. Oh, yes. 

The President, But the treaties will no doubt create certain 
territories which fall under the trusteeship which will lead to manda- 
tories. 

Senator Johnson of California. So that there is a very important — 
in fact, the most important — part of the territorial world settlement 
yet to be made ? 

The President. Well, in extent, yes. Senator; so far as the amount 
of territory covered is concerned, yes. 

Senator Johnson of California. Not only in extent, but in their 
character, and in the numbers of peoples involved, too, Mr. President. 
Is not that accurate ? 

The President. Well, you may be right. Senator; I do not know. 

Senator Johnson of California. I think you answered to Senator 
Borah the question I am about to ask, so pardon me if it is repetitive. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 29 

It is this: Was the United States Government officially informed, at 
any time between the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany 
and the signing of the armistice, of agreements made by the alHed 
Governments in regard to the settlement of the war ? 

The President. No ; not so far as I know. 

Senator Johnson of California. So far as you are aware, was it 
unofficially informed during that period ? 

The President. I would be more clear in my answer, Senator, if I 
knew just what you were referring to. 

Senator Johnson of California. I am referring to the so-called 
secret treaties which disposed of territory among the belligerents. 

The President. You mean like the treaty of London ? 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes; like the London pact. 

The President. No; no, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. Could you state whether or not 
any official investigation was made by our Government to ascertain 
whether or not there were any such treaties of territorial disposition ? 

The President. There was no such investigation. 

Senator Johnson of California. These specific treaties, then — the 
treaty of London, on the basis of which Italy entered the war; the 
agreement with Roumania, in August, 1916; the various agreements 
in respect to Asia Minor, and the agreements consummated in the 
winter of 1917 between France and Russia relative to the frontiers of 
Germany, and particularly in relation to the Saar Valley and the left 
bank of the Rhine — none of these did we (and when I say "we" I 
mean you, IVIr. President) have any knowledge of prior to the con- 
ference at Paris ? 

The President. No, sir. I can confidently answer that "No," in 
regard to myself. 

Senator McCumber. Senator Johnson, may I ask the President 
right here whether or not after we entered into the war any treaties 
were made between any of our cobelligerents that were not given 
to us. 

The President. No, sir; I do not know of any. 

Senator McCumber. Then the secret treaties that you have 
reference to were made prior to the time we entered into the war ? 

The President. Yes, sir. 

Senator McCumber. After that, our cobelligerents withheld 
nothing from us ; did they ? 

The President. They entered into no agreements. 

Senator Borah. Well, you asked. Senator, if they withheld any- 
thing from us. They withheld all that they had had previousl}'- ? 

The President. No, no; but he means. Did they withhold any 
agreement that they made after we entered the war? 

Senator McCumber. That is just what I meant. 

Senator Johnson of California. We do not know of any engage- 
ments which have been made subsequent to our entering into the war ? 

The President. No, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. Those that I have referred to — 
and I say this. Senator, so that you will have no error in respect to 
it — I referred wholly, I think, to the treaties that were prior to our 
entry into the war. 

The President. Yes- 



30 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Johnson of California. Were you familiar, Mr. President, 
please, with any agreements that were made by the allied Govern- 
ments with the Czecho-Slovak National Council, the Polish National 
Council, and the Jugo-Slav National Committee ? 

The President. I was aware of arrangements similar to those that 
we had ourselves made recognizing those national committees as 
provisional representatives of the people. 

Senator Johnson of California. But merely as recognizing govern- 
ments, and that these committees represented the peoples of the 
various countries ? 

The President. Yes; and the recognition was purely informal. 
It was not an international recognition, but an agreement to deal 
with them as representatives. 

Senator Johnson of California. When our Government through 
you, Mr. President, in January, 1918, made the 14 points as the basis 
for peace, were those points made with the knowledge of the exist- 
ence of the secret agreements'? 

The President. No; oh, no. 

Senator Johnson of California. It was not intended, then, by the 
expression of these 14 points, to supplant the aims contained in the 
secret treaties ? 

The President. Since I knew nothing of them, necessarily not. 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes; quite so. Do you know, Mr. 
President, or is it permissible for us to be told, whether France has 
special military agreements with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia ? 

The President. I know of none, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. Did China enter the war upon our 
advice — the advice of the United States ? 

The President. I can not tell, sir. We advised her to enter, and 
she soon after did. She had sought our advice. Wliether that was 
the persuasive advice or not, I do not know. 

Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall, Mr. President, that 
preceding that advice we had asked China, as one of the neutral 
nations, to sever diplomatic relations with Germany ? 

The President. Whether we had asked her ? 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir. 

The President. I do not recall. Senator. I am sure Mr. Lansing 
can tell, though, from the records of the department. 

Senator Johnson of California. Do you know, Mr. President, 
whether or not our Government stated to China that if Chma would 
enter the war we would protect her interests at the peace conference ? 

The President. We made no promises. 

Senator Johnson of California. No representations of that sort ? 

The President. No. She knew that we would as well as we could. 
She had every reason to know that. 

Senator Johnson of California. Pardon me a further question: 
You did make the attempt to do it, too ; did you not ? 

The President. Oh, indeed I did ; very seriously. 

Senator Johnson of California. And the decision ultimately 
reached at the pe^ce conference was a disappointment to you ? 

The President. Yes, sir ; I may frankly say that it was. 

Senator Johnson of California. You would have preferred, as I 
think most of us would, that there had been a different conclusion 
of the Shantung provision, or the Shantung difficulty or controversy, 
at the Paris peace conference? 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 31 

The President. Yes; I frankly intimated that. 

Senator Johnson of California. Did it require the unanimous 
consent of the members of the peace conference to reach a decision 
like the Shantung decision ? 

The President. Every decision; yes, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. Do you recall, Mr. President, prior 
to the decision on the territorial question of Shantung, or of German 
rights in Shantung, the racial equality question coming before the 
peace conference ? 

The President. I remember that at one of the sessions called 
plenary sessions a resolution regarding that matter was introduced 
by the Japanese representatives, but rather as an expression of 
opinion or hope, and it was not pressed for action. 

Senator Johnson of California. Mr. President, the press at that 
time stated that it had gone to a vote — and I trust some one will 
correct me if I am in error — and that the vote was 11 to 6 upon the 
proposition. The dispatches at that time were to that effect. 

The President. I was misled, Senator. You are referring to the 
commission on a league of nations ? 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes. 

The President. There was a vote there. There never was a vote 
on any subject in the peace conference. 

Senator Johnson of Calif ornia. I confounded the two. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Johnson of California. May I ask, if permissible, how the 
representatives of the United States voted upon that particular 
jDroposition ? 

The President. Senator, I think it is very natural you should 
ask that. I am not sure that I am at liberty to answer, because that 
touches the intimacy of a great many controversies that occurred in 
that conference, and I think it is best, in the interest of international 
good understanding, that I should not answer. 

Senator Johnson of California. Do you know, ^Mr. President, 
whether or not the American Commission at Paris urged that a defi- 
nite sum of reparation be fixed in the treaty ? 

The President. It did. 

Senator Johnson of California. Will you state, if appropriate, why 
that view did not prevail ? 

The President. No, Senator, I can not; and yet I dislike to 
decline, because it may create a misapprehension on your part. Let 
me see if I can explain it, without indiscretion: I would be very glad, 
gentlemen, to tell you all about it, if you will leave it out of the notes. 
May I do that ? — because I do not wish to leave any wrong impression 
on your minds. The explanation is perfectly simple. 

Senator Brandegee. What is the question, please ? 

The President. The question is, Why was the pohcy urged by the 
United States, that we fix a definite sum of reparation in the treaty, 
not adopted ? 

Senator Borah. I would be content to have it left out of the notes 
upon your request; but I am afraid it would still get to the pubhc, 
and that would put us in an embarrassing position. 

The President. It is not an explanation discreditable to anybody, 
but it is an international secret. I am quite at liberty to say that the 



32 TKEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

United States financial representatives — who, by the way, made an 
admirable impression upon everybody over there — did advocate the 
fixing of a definite sum for reparation. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, may I ask, to clear up a difficulty 
in my own mind, whether you regard the answering of these ques- 
tions as an indiscretion because of the fact that there are other 
negotiations pending which might be affected ? 

The President. Oh, no, su-; simply because they affect the internal 
political affairs of other countries. 

Senator Fall. Then, in your judgment, these matters should 
never be given publicity ? 

The President, Matters of this sort. 

Senator Fall. I say, matters of this sort that have been referred to, 
should, in your judgment, never be given publicity; and it is not 
because of penduig or other negotiations? 

The President. Oh, no; I think they should not be given pub- 
licity. 

Senator Johnson of California. I thank you very much, Mr. 
President. That is all I desire to ask. 

The President. You have been very considerate in putting your 
questions. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, as I suggested, I have prepared 
several written questions, for the purpose of concentratuig my owii 
ideas, and several of them, I may say, are somewhat in sequence, 
and I feel that if we are going to hold hearings all day — that is, 
if we are all going to have the time and do not get into arguments 
among ourselves — possibly it might be just to you to submit these 
questions, as I have prepared them, to you first, and allow you to 
look them over before I pursue the line of mquiry. However, that is, 
of course, entirely with you. They do not all refer directly to pro- 
visions of the treaty nor to the construction of the treaty, but to other 
matters relating to the treaty. 

Senator Johnson of California. Before you do that. Senator, with 
the President's permission may I ask one or two more questions con- 
cerning Shantung which I omitted or forgot? 

The President. Certainly, Senator. 

Senator Johnson of California. First, did Japan decline to sign 
the award as made or provided in the peace treaty ? 

The President. Her representatives informed us, Senator, that 
they were instructed not to sign in that event. 

Senator Johnson of California. Was the determination finally 
reached a balancing of the difficulties or the disadvantages that 
might arise because of the balancing of those advantages or dis- 
advantages ? 

The President. I do not know that I could answer that either 
"yes'' or "no," Senator. It was a matter of many conversations 
and of many arguments and persuasions. 

Senator Johnson of California. Was the decision reached — if you 
will pardon the perfectly blunt question — because Japan declined to 
sign unless that decision was reached in that way? 

The President. No; I do not think it would be true to say "yes" 
to that question. It was reached because we thought it was the 
best that could be got, in view of the definite engagements of Great 
Britain and France, and the necessity of a unanimous decision, which 
we held to be necessary in every case we have decided. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 33 

Senator Johnson of California. Great Britain and France adhered 
to their original engagements, did they not? 

The President. They said that they did not feel at liberty to 
disregard them. 

Senator Johnson of California. And you, Mr. President, were the 
one who was endeavoring to determine — I gather this from the news 
dispatches — the question upon its merits and its justice. 

The President. Our Government was the only Government free 
under the circumstances; ^'"es. 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir. Do you mind stating, 
or would you prefer not, what it was that caused you ultimately to 
accede to the decision that was demanded by Japan ? 

The President. Only the conclusion that I thought that it was 
the best that could be got under the circumstances. 

Senator Brandegee. May I interpolate there without disturbing 
you, Senator Johnson ? 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. In Part 6 of the hearings before our com- 
mittee, on page 182, Senator Johnson of California questioned Secre- 
tary Lansing. [Reading:] 

Senator Johnson of California. Was the Shantung decision made in order to 
have the Japanese signatures to the league of nations? 

Secretary Lansing. That I can not say. 

Senator Johnson of California. In your opinion was it? 

Secretary Lansing. I would not want to say that, because I really have not the 
facts on which to form an opinion along that line. 

Senator Johnson of California. Would the Japanese signatures to the league of 
nations have been obtained if you had not made the Shantung agreement? 

Secretaiy Lansing. I think so. 

Senator Johnson of California. You do? 

Secretary Lansing. I think so. 

Senator Johnson of California. So that even though Shantung had not been de- 
livered to Japan, the league of nations would not have been injured? 

Secretary Lansing. I do not think so. 

Senator Johnson of California. And you would have had the same signatories that 
you have now? 

Secretary Lansing. Yes; one more, China. 

Senator Johnson of California. One more, China. So that the result of the Shan- 
tung decision was simply to lose China's signature rather than to gain Japan's? 

Secretary Lansing. That is my personal view, but I may be wrong about it. 

Senator Johnson of California. ^Vhy did you yield on a question on which you 
thought you ought not to yield and that you thought was a principle? 

Secretary Lansing. Because naturally we were subject to the direction of the 
President of the United States. 

Senator Johnson of California. And it was solely because you felt that you were 
subject to the decision of the President of the United States that you yielded? 

:Secretary Lansing. Yes. 

Senator Johnson of California. The decision is his? 

Secretary Lansing. Necessarily. 

Now, I wondered whether Secretary Lansing was well informed 
:about this question or not ? 

The President. Well, my conclusion is different from his, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. You could not have got the signature of 
Japan if you had not given Shantung to Japan? 

The President. That is my judgment. 

Senator Brandegee. You say you were notified to that effect? 

The President. Yes, sir. 



34 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Swanson. As I understand, you were notified that they 
had instructions not to sign unless this was included. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Borah. And was it your judgment that after the treaty 
had been ratified, China's rights would be protected and Japan would 
surrender to China what she said she would ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Swanson. As I understand it, you consider this verbal 
agreement effective as relating to Shantung and you understood that 
this conveyance would be followed by a conveyance to China. 

The President. Not to supersede it, but the action by Japan is to 
follow. 

Senator Johnson of California. I beg your pardon, what was your 
question ? 

Senator Swanson. The conveyance or retransfer of the German 
possessions in Shantung is to be followed by Japan's conveyance of 
this back to China, according to this agreement. One is as effective 
as the other. 

Senator Johnson of California. Yes; but, Mr. President, you would 
have much preferred to haA^e a different disposition, notwithstanding 
the promise of Japan in the treaty, would you not ? 

The President. Yes, sir. 

Senator Fall, would this be a practical suggestion ? I have no ob- 
jection to sittmg here all day. Indeed, I have taken the liberty of 
having lunch prepared, if the gentlemen of the committee would be 
kind enough to join me. But since your questions are written, per- 
haps you might leave them with me and let me give such answers as 
I feel I can. 

Senator Fall. Precisely, Mr. President. I can say to you, sir, that 
I prepared the questions with some care for the purpose of informing 
myself, and I think that it might not be entirely fair to you to answer 
oft'hand a series of questions, when I have the theory in mind along 
which I am propounding the questions — that is, one may lead to 
another — and I think it would be only fair to you that you might 
have the questions so you can read them and follow it. 

The President. Will you state the theory at the top [laughter] ? 

Senator Fall. There are two or three theories! The first c^uestion 
that I would like to ask is, "In your judgment have you not the au- 
thority by proclamation to declare in words that peace exists, and 
thus restore the status of peace between the Government and the 
people of this country and those with whom we declared war?" If 
you choose, I will read the following question. 

The President. That sets the key to them, I suppose. 

Senator Fall. To several of them. Then there are others cvlon :; 
other lines, one of which leads to another. 

The President. I would be happy to answer them as far as I ca:i. 

Senator Fall. That can be done later or now, just as you please. 

Senator Williams. Suppose we take a recess. 

The Chairman. I do not know whether there are any more ques- 
tions. 

The President. I had thought that I would send you in the 
replies. 

Senator Fall. That would certainly be satisfactory to me. You 
would have no objection to the same publicity that is being given 
now ? 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 35 

The President. No. 

Senator Fall. There are two or three different lines of questions. 

Senator McCumber. You would probably get more clear informa- 
tion if you take that method. 

Senator Fall. I think so. They are not in any sense, Mr. President, 
prepared as catch questions, otherwise I would not submit them to 
you. If you were on the stand, and I were cross-examining you as a 
witness, I would prefer not to let you see the whole series of questions. 
But I think that is fair, and so far as I am concerned if it is satis- 
factory to you it would be more satisfactory to me. 

Senator Brandegee. In reply to Senator Lodge's inquiry I jotted 
down a few questions at random with the idea of asking some if they 
had not been touched upon by other members of the committee. 
I have some that I would like to ask, but I want to conform to the 
convenience of the President and the committee as to when it shall be 
done. I do not mean to delay you on your luncheon hour or anything 
of that kind. 

The President. The luncheon hour is 1 o'clock, and I was ia 
hopes that you gentlemen would remain for lunch. 

Senator Brandegee. I do not 'want to absorb the remaining time 
if other Senators want to go on now. I am perfectly willing to wait 
until they are finished. 

Senator Harding. I would like to hear your questions. 

Senator Brandegee. I am not sure what questions I will ask 
except I made some notes. 

Senator Williams. I would rather come back to-morrow morning 
at half past 10. 

Senator Hitchcock. We ha ve an engagement to-morrow morning 
for the committee. 

The Chairman. I think we must have some consideration for the 
President's time. 

Senator Harding. I just want to reserve one question. 

Senator Brandegee. Do you not want to ask it now? 

The Chairman, We have until 1 o'clock. 

Senator Brandegee. I have here the President's statement 
which he read to us when we met here this morning, and in it he 
states : 

Nothing, I am led to believe, stands in the way of the ratification of the treaty 
except certain doubts with regard to the meaning and implication of certain articles 
of the covenant of the league" of nations; and I must frankly say that I am unable 
to understand why such doubts should be entertained. 

Now, I do not believe the President is correctly informed as to 
the situation if he believes that. There are things in the treaty 
itself which militate against the ratification, in my opinion, of the 
treaty without amendment. Did you have in mind, tir. President, 
when you read that to us, the Shantung provision of the treaty ^ 

Tlie President, I certainly had that in mind. Senator, but I did 
not understand that that stood in the way of ratification. I am, of 
course, acting only upon such information as I have received. 

Senator Brandegee. I understand — and that is the reason of 
taking the liberty of suggesting to you that you may not be well 
informed in this respect. Of course there is opposition by a great 
many Senators to the entire covenant of the league of nations, which 



36 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMAISTY. 

I have no doubt jou know, that is, article 1 of the treaty of Ver- 
sailles. Then there is opposition to the various parts of the cove- 
nants of the league and not to the whole league, by other Senators. 
Then there is a great opposition, fundamental and sincere, to the 
Shantung provision, which is in the body of the treaty itself, and 
wliich can only be cured by an amendment. As I understand it, 
no reservation that we could make in the resolution of ratification 
would be effective to strike out the Shantung provision. It must 
be cured,, if it is cured, by a straight out-and-out amendment, striking 
that from the treaty. "That, of course, would necessitate the re- 
submission of the treaty to the signatories who have already signed it. 
Now, you state later on that every suggestion of the United States 
was accepted, that is after you went back, after you had your con- 
ference with us last March, and having obtained our views as to the 
necessity for certain changes in the first draft of the covenant, you 
state [reading] : 

The view of the United States with regard to the questions I have mentioned had, 
in fact, already been accepted by the commission and there was supposed to be nothing 
inconsistent with them in the draft of the covenant first adopted. 

And omitting a few lines which do not apply to that you say 

[reading] : 

There was absolutely no doubt as to the meaning of any one of the resulting pro- 
visions of the covenant in the minds of those who participated in drafting them, and 
I respectfully submit that there is nothing vague or doubtful in their wording. 

Of course that is your opinion, if I may say so. 

The President. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. But you are familiar with the statements, 
I have no doubt, that ex-Senator Root, Justice Hughes, Mr. Taft, 
and other able lawyers of the country have made with respect 
to the necessity for reservations if we are to ratify the treaty, are 
you not ? 

The President. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. That is, you admit that there are grave 
doubts among the ablest lawyers of the country as to the necessity for 
reservations or the alternative between reservations and ratifying 
the whole treaty, as it is expressed in the vernacular, without the 
dotting of an "i" or the crossing of a ''t." 

The President. I admit that there are those difficulties in a 
great many minds. 

Senator Brandegee. Now, of course, it is true, is it not, that if 
difficulties arise as to the construction of any provision of the treaty 
after we have passed from the scene, what we thought the provisions 
of the treaty or of the covenant meant, will not be very powerful 
in the construction that may be placed upon it by those who then 
have to determine what it means, will it ? 

The President. The vote of the United States will be essential. 

Senator Brandegee. I do not mean that. The fact that you 
think now that everything in the treaty is plain and that there is 
no doubt about the meaning of an}- provisions, and the fact that I 
think there is grave doubt about many of the provisions, will not 
seriously affect the opinion of the council or of the arbitrator that 
finally passes upon the true meaning of the treaty when dispute 
arises. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMAISTY. 37 

The President. No, Senator; but the plain wordino; of the treaty- 
will have a great deal to do, and the meanino; of the wordins; is plain. 

Senator Brandegee. That is simply another way of stating-, is it 
not, that you are clear in your opinion that the provisions of the treaty 
are plain? But I am suggesting that there will he a dispute between 
nations as to what the treaty means after we have passed from the 
scene. 

The President. No, sir; it is a question of being confident of 
what language means, not confident of an opinion. 

Senator Brandegee. I mean, we derive our opinions as to the 
meanings of the treaty from the language of the treaty, do we not? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Now they would derive their construction 
of what the treaty means from the language of it, we not being 
there ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. So that what we think about it now will not 
be determinative in an international court or before an arbitrator 20 
years hence in case of a dispute between two nations as to the mean- 
ing of the treaty? 

The President. Certainly not, but the language will. 

Senator Brandegee. Of course they will have the language before 
them, but the language which determines- it is now in dispute be- 
tween you and certain lawyers of the country and certain Senators 
as to its meaning. Now what provision is there in the treaty for 
the determination of a dispute as to the interpretation of a clause 
of the treaty if such dispute arises ? 

The President. The covenant states that there are certain ques- 
tions which are acknowledged as being especially suitable for sub- 
mission to arbitration. One of those is the meaning of the treaty. 

Senator Brandegee. What does the treaty provide about that? 

The President. You have it there, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. Yes, sir; I wondered if you remembered it. 

The President. I think I do so, but you have the language. 

Senator Brandegee. Yes. Article 12 of the league provides 
[reading] : 

The members of the league agree that if there should arise between them any dis- 
pute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to 
inquiry by the council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months 
after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the council. 

That is, if there is a dispute, as I construe this, between members 
of the league as to the meaning of the covenant or any article thereof, 
it shall be referred to the arbitrators. 

The President. Only if the parties agree. 

Senator Brandegee. Or to the council? 

The President. Or to the council; yes. 

Senator Brandegee. That is, the council is to determine the mean- 
ing of the covenant? 

The President, No, Senator; I beg your pardon. There are two 
processes. If the parties agree to submit to arbitration, of course 
it is submitted to arbitration, and the decision is final. If they 
think it is a question that they are not willing to submit to arbitra- 
tion, then they must submit it to the council for an expression of 
opmion and a recommendation, but that opinion and recommenda- 
tion do not bind. ♦ 



38 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Brandegee. Is there any possible way authoritatively 
of determining without war what the treaty means? 

The President. That is true of every treaty, Senator. If you 
re-express it in the language of the Senators to whom you refer and 
there is a dispute about the meaning of that, the same would apply. 
You can not use any language, I assume, which could not possibly 
give rise to some sort of dispute. 

Senator Brandegee. I assume that if it provided that if there 
should arise between the members of the league any dispute in rela- 
tion to the construction of any article of the covenant of the league 
of nations, such dispute should be referred to an arbitrator, and the 
members would agree to be bound by its decision; that would be an 
agreement for an authoritative determination of what the treaty 
meant. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Now, as it is they will submit the matter 
either to arbitration or to inquiry by the council, and so forth. Now, 
you say that the opinion of the council to which the dispute has been 
submitted is only advisory? 

The President. Yes, sir. 

Senator Brandegee. Then suppose one party to the dispute 
against whom the council decides declines to abide by it? 

The President. Then there is war, but not within three months 
of the opinion of the council. 

Senator Brandegee. Under article 10 the members of the league 
undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members 
of the league. That is a contract between the signatories. We say: 
"We undertake to preserve the territorial integrity of the members 
against external aggression," which means that we contract to do it, 
does it not ? 

Tlie President. We engage to do it. 

Senator Brandegee. It means an international contract, does it 
not, a compact, an agreement? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Whether that is a moral or legal obligation, 
it is an obligation? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Of course, it is a moral duty to keep a 
promise, and this is an international promise; so that the distinction 
between a moral obligation and a legal one seems to me to be not of 
great importance, because we are obligated in any event. 

The President. Pardon me; I think it is of the greatest im- 
portance, because the element of jud^nent enters into it as it does 
not in the other. 

Senator Brandegee. You mean the judgment as to whether or 
not it is a moral obligation ? 

The President. No. For example, a question is submitted to 
arbitration and it is agreed that the decision shall be final. The 
judgment of one of the parties to the controversy may be that the 
decision is a very bad one, but it has to accept it; the element of 
judgment is excluded altogether; but, with regard to the method of 
lulfilling the obligations of a covenant like that under consideration 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 39 

there is freedom of judgment on the part of the individual members 
of the league. It seems to me that makes a very considerable differ- 
ence. 

Senator Harding. Will the Senator permit me to interrupt right 
there ? 

Senator Brandegee. I will. 

Senator Harding. I dislike to interrupt the Senator. 

Senator Brandegee. I yield to the Senator. 

Senator Harding. The President expressed a while ago surprise 
that I raised a question as to the value of this compact because of 
the moral obligation feature. Let me premise by the statement that 
I look upon a moral obligation as that which the conscience of the 
contracting party impels. The conscience of any nation in Europe, 
for example, may be warped by its prejudices, racial, geographical, 
and otherwise. If that be true and any nation ma}' put aside or 
exercise its judgment as to the moral obligation in accepting any 
recommendation of the league, really what do we get out of this 
international compact in the enforcement of any decree ? 

The President. We get the centering upon it generally of the 
definite opinion of the world, expressed through the authoritative 
organs of the responsible governments. 

Senator Harding. Another question: That is surrendering the 
suggestion of a moral obligation for this Republic to the prejudices 
or necessities of the nations of the Old World, is it not ? 

The President. I do not understand that we make such a sur- 
render. 

Senator Harding. Would you not understand a decree by the 
council to be a suggestion of this moral obligation ? 

The President. Certainly I would, but we would have to concur 
in that before it had any force of any kind. 

Senator Harding. Would it not be quite as moral for this Republic 
itself to determine its moral obligations ? 

The President. Undoubtedly, Senator; but in the meantime the 
world would not have the knowledge before it that there will be con- 
certed action by aU the responsible governments of the world in the 
protection of the peace of the world. The minute you do away with 
that assurance to the world you have reached the situation which 
produced the German war. 

Senator Harding. What becomes of our standing among nations if 
the council fixes a moral obligation upon us and we reject the judg- 
ment of the council as to the moral obligation ? 

The President. Pardon me if I remind you that we always have 
to concur in that. 

Senator Harding. Precisely; but the council state what consti- 
tutes the moral obligation, if we agree; but if we do not agree, then, 
in the eyes of the world we have rejected its judgment as to a moral 
obligation. 

The President. Certainly; and I hold that we are at liberty to 
do that, if our moral judgment honestly differs from the moral judg- 
ment of the world. 

Senator Harding. Tlien, let us go back to the original inquiry. 
What permanent value is there, then, to this compact? 

The President. The greatest permanent value. Senator, is the 
point that I have raised. We are assuming that the United States 
will not concur in the general moral judgment of the world. In my 



40 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

opinion, she generally will. If it had been known that this war was 
coming on, her moral judgment would have concurred with that of 
the other Governments of the world, with that of the other peoples 
of the world; and if Germany had known that there was a possibility 
of that sort of concurrence, she never would have dared to do what 
she did. Without such notice served on the powers that may wish 
to repeat the folly that Germany commenced, there is no assurance 
to the world that there will be peace even for a generation, whereas 
if they know beforehand that there will be that concert of judgment, 
there is the most tremendous guaranty. 

Senator Harding. But, Mr. President, nobody expressed for us 
our moral obligation to enter into this war. That was our own 
expression, was it not ? 

The President. Certainly; it was our concurrence in the judg- 
ment of the world. 

Senator Harding. One of the points I am getting at, if I can 
make it clear, is the necessity of a wTitten compact for this Republic 
to fulfill its moral obligations to civilization. 

The President. Senator, this Republic, if I interpret it rightly, 
does not need a suggestion- from any quarter to fulfill its moral 
obligations. 

Senator Harding. I quite agree with that. 

The President. But it steadies the whole world by its promise 
beforehand that it will stand with other nations of similar judgment 
to maintain right in the world. 

Senator Fall. Mr. President, then if the commissioner of the 
United States on the council were to join with the other members 
of the council in fixing a moral obligation upon the United States, 
and the Congress and the President, acting as part of the legislative 
branch of the Government, were to reject that judgment, would it 
not have a very disastrous effect upon the league, throw the world 
into chaos, and undo all that has been done ? 

The President. It might; but you are assuming a case 

Senator Fall. Certainly; we have to assume cases. 

The President. Where we would have to assume that responsi- 
bility, because, being part of the Government, we would in every 
case really express the judgment of the American people, and if the 
unhappy time should ever come when that judgment is against the 
judgment of the rest of the world we would have to express it. 

Senator Fall. Certainly. Mr. President, I am possibly looking, 
as Bacon said, at a distance. 

Senator McCumber. Would our moral conviction of the unright- 
eousness of the German war have brought us into this war if Ger- 
many had not committed any acts against us, without the league of 
nations, as, of course, we had no league of nations at that time ? 

The President. I hope it would eventual]y, Senator, as things 
developed. 

Senator McCumber. Do you think if Germany had committed no 
act of war or no act of injustice against our citizens that we would 
have gotten into this war ? 

The President. I do think so. 

Senator McCumber. You think we would have gotten in anyway? 

The President. I do. 

Senator Brandegee. If I may be allowed to resume, for I kept still 
all morning 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 41 

Senator Fall. If the Senator will pardon me a moment, I am goin^ 
to ask the President to excuse me, as I have an engagement. 

The President. I am sorry, Senator, that you are obliged to leave. 

Senator Fall. I regret, sir, that I have an engagement with my 
wife, who is not in very sood health. 

Senator Brandegee. Now, if I may ])roceed without interruption, 
which breaks the continuity of my thought and uses a great deal of 
time, I will be through in a very few miimtes. As I understand the 
President, his construction of article 10 is that if the council considers 
the question of external aggression upon a member of the league, we, 
having signed this treaty with article 10 in it, in which we undertake 
to preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity of all 
members of the league, can then say, it is a moral question into which 
the element of judgment enters and we, considering our judgment 
binding at the time, do not care to agree to the recommendation of 
the council. If every member of the league is at liberty to take that 
view of its moral and legal obligations under article 10, and declines 
to do what the council recommends, and if it is known in advance 
that that is the construction placed upon article 10 by those who 
framed it, it does not seem to me^— and this is merely my opinion — 
that the terror to wrongdoers by what is hoped to be the united, 
concerted action of the members of the league in the concentration 
of its powers to suppress the wrongdoer will have the effect that the 
President thinks it Mall. In other v.^ords, I do not think that Germany 
would have refrained from war if she had known that article 10 was 
in existence. 

Article 10 says: 

In case of any such aggression, or in case of any threat or danger of snch aggression, 
the council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled. 

There is no doubt that that is an obligation in a contract, and I 
know of but one way to perform an obligation that you have con- 
tracted to perform, and that is to perform it. I do not think that 
it admits of any qualifications after you sign the treaty. I want to 
call attention also to the fact that the external aggression which we 
undertake, if we sign this treaty, to repel or guarantee against is not 
stated in the treaty at all to be an unwarranted aggression. I wish 
to ask the President, if the league were in existence and Hungary and 
Roumania were members of it, and Roumania were in the position she 
now is, having raided the territorial integrity of Hungary and marched 
through its capital and occupied it, and the council, as its duty would 
be under the covenant, considered what was best to be done and 
advised us to send immediately to cooperate with them 100,000 m.en, 
whether we would be at liberty to discuss whether we were morally 
bound by article 10 of the covenant and decline to send the men, and, 
if we were, could we do it without risking being called an ''inter- 
national slacker" by the other members of the league? 

The President. Senator, since you have made the case a concrete 
one I am afraid I ought not to answer it, because it involves a judg- 
ment as between Roumania and Hungary. 

Senator Brandegee. I withdraw the names of the two countries, 
and assume the circumstances. 

The President. Let me say that I take it for granted that in 
practically every case the United States would respond ; but that does 
not seem to be the question. I quite agree with you that a moral 



42 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

obligation is to be fulfilled, and I am confident that our Nation will 
fulfill it, but that does not remove from each individual case the 
element of judgment which we are free to exercise in two stages: We 
are, first, free to exercise it in the vote of our representative on the 
council, who will of course act under instructions from the home Gov- 
ernment; and, in the second place, we are to exercise it when the 
President, acting upon the action of the council, makes his recom- 
mendation to Congress. Then, Congress is to exercise its judgment 
as to whether or not the instructions of the Executive to our member 
of the council were well founded, and whether the case is one of 
distinct moral obligation. 

Senator Brandegee. Suppose that each member of the council, 
as you say, acting under instructions from its home Government, 
including our representative on the council, should think, for instance, 
that Roumania was entirely right in some invasion of Hungary, and 
public sentiment was that way, but that our Government instructed 
our representative to vote with the foreign members of the council 
to support Hungary — suppose the public sentiment of the other 
members and of the people of this country were in favor of Roumania, 
what sort of a position would we be in to fulfill our guaranty ? 

The President. In order to answer that question I must go a little 
bit afield. In the first place, I understand that article to mean that 
no nation is at liberty to invade the territorial integrity of another. 
That does not mean to invade for purposes of warfare, but to impair 
the territorial integrity of another nation. Its territorial integrity 
is not destroyed by armed intervention; it is destroyed by the 
retention of tenitory, by taking territory away from it; that impairs 
its territorial integrity. I understand the covenant to mean that 
that is in no case permissible by the action of a single nation against 
another; that there is only one permissible method and that is, if 
territorial arrangements are unsatisfactory, that they should be 
brought to the attention of the world through the league and that then 
the league should exercise such rights as it may be able to exercise for 
a readjustment of boundaries. 

I believe that tenitorial aggression, in the sense of territorial 
capture, is, by the wording of the act, made illegitimate. 

Senator Brandegee. The words are not ''territorial aggression," 
but "external aggression." 

Tlie President. But it says the preservation of its territorial 
integrity against external aggression. 

Senator Brandegee. Suppose the external aggressor, having got- 
ten within the territory of the aggressee, stays there ? 

The President. Then that impairs the territorial integrity. 

Senator Brandegee. Certainly; and then on a call by the council 
for us to perform our international contract under article 10, if 
Congress does not favor performing it, you think we would not be 
subject to criticism by the other members of the league ? 

The President. Oh, we might be subject to criticism; but I 
think Congress would be at liberty to form its own judgment as to 
the circumstances. 

Senator Brandegee. I agree with you entirely, and under our 
Constitution Congress would have to do so. 

The President. Yes; that is understood by all. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 43 

Senator Brandegee. Of course; but I am assuming if the council 
should advise us to do a certain thing, and Congress refused to do it — ■ 
and if every nation's representative assembly can do the same thing, 
it seems to me like a rope of sand and not an effective tribunal which 
would result in promoting peace. 

The President. The reason I do not agree with you, Senator, is 
that I do not think such a refusal would likely often occur. I believe 
it would be only upon the gravest grounds — and in case Congress is 
right, I am indifferent to foreign criticism. 

Senator Brandegee. Of course, we would always think we were 
right, I assume. Now, I wish to call your attention to article 15. I 
do this simply because you think all these provisions are clear, and 
I want to say in that connection that we had Mr. Miller, who described 
himself as the technical expert or adviser to the American Peace 
Commission, especially, I think, on questions of international law. 

The President. The league of nations. 

Senator Brandegee. We had him before our committee, and he 
answered this question, that I am about to ask, in three different 
ways, and we could not, of course, get much information from him; 
and he promised to take it under advisement and to give us his con- 
sidered opinion, but he has not done so. Now, article 15, in the last 
two paragraphs provides: 

The council may in any case uiider this article refer the dispute to the assembly. 
The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided 
that such request be made wathin 14 days after the submission of the dispute to the 
council. 

In any case referred to the assembly, all the pro\'isions of this article and of article 
12 relating to the action and powers of the council shall apply to the action and powers 
of the assembly, provided that a report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the 
representatives of those members of the league represented on the council and of a 
majority of the other members of the league, exclusive in each case of the representa- 
tives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same force as a report by the council 
concurred in by all the members thereof other than the representati 'es of one or more 
of the parties to the dispute. 

Now, in the first place, it sa3^s '^represented on the council and of a 
majority of the other members of the league." Does that mean that 
the various members of the league have got to act upon that as sepa- 
rate Governments, or does it mean the representatives of the other 
members of the league ? 

The President. I do not quite understand that question. 

Senator Brandegee. It says: 

A report made by the assembly, if concurred in by the representatives of those 
members of the league represented on the council and of a majority of the other mem- 
bers of the league. 

Does that mean there " and a majority of the other representatives 
of members of the league in the assembly" ? 

The President. Yes; I assume so. 

Senator Brandegee. But it does not say so. It leaves it as though 
the members of the league could act independently of their repre- 
sentatives and the assembly. 

The President. Oh, no. 

Senator Brandegee. I assume it means what you say. 

The President. Yes; I assume that. 

Senator Brandegee. Very well. Now, the question: Supposing 
there were a dispute between the United States and that portion of the 
British Empire known as the United Kingdom — England, Ireland, 



44 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Scotland, and Wales — as to some right of one of our ships to enter an 
English port, for instance, and that dispute should come before the 
council, and, upon the request of Great Britain, it should be removed 
to the assembly. The article I have just read provides for a report 
concurred in "exclusive in each case of the representatives of the 
parties to the dispute." 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Now, all the self-governing colonies of 
England, or at least five of them, have a vote in the assembly, and 
the British Empire also has a vote. I assume in the cme of the 
dispute which I have supposed, of course, the United States would be 
excluded from voting, as being a party to the dispute; and I assume 
the British Empire would be excluded, but I am not sure. 

The President. Yes, sir; that is what I assume. 

Senator Brandegee. Do you assume also that Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and India would be excluded ? 

The President. They are parts of the British Empire. 

Senator Brandegee. They a^e parts of the British Empire, but 
are they parties to the dispute which I have supposed to have arisen 
between us and England ? 

The President. I admit. Senator, that that is a complicated 
question; but my judgment about it is c{uite clear. I think I can 
give one instead of three answers. 

Senator Brandegee. Yes. 

The President. Disputes can arise only through the Governments 
which have international representation. In other words, diplo- 
matically speaking, there is only one "British Empire." The parts 
of it a^'e but pieces of the whole. The dispute, therefore, in the case 
you have supposed, would be between the United States as a di])lo- 
mat'c unit and the British Empire as a diplomatic unit. That is the 
only ground upon which the two nations could deal with one another, 
whether bv wav of dispute or agreement. Therefore, I have assumed, 
and confidently assumed, that the representatives of all pa^-ts of the 
British Empire would be excluded. 

Senator Brandegee. I should think that "^"ould be only fair, and 
I would assume that; but Mr. Miller ans"''ered that (|uestion by saymg, 
first, that he was in doubt; secondly, that the self-r overning colonies 
of Great Britain or of the British Empire would not be excluded, 
because they were not parties to the dispute; and then, third, that 
thev ■^^'ould be excluded because they r^ero parts of the British Empire; 
and if the legal adviser of the commission v as that much confused, I 
feel that I need not apolof izo for beino- confused myself. 

The President. No; but the commission was not confused. 

Senator Knox. May I sav this: I v as not present at the meeting 
when Mr. Miller testified. The fact is that " hile it is teclmically true, 
as the President says, that the Biitish self-roverning colonies deal 
di])lomatically through the British forei' n office, it is only true in a 
most technical sense. They are absolutely autonomous, even in 
their diplomatic dealings, as to matters that affect them. For in- 
stance, I remember when the Canadian reciprocity aoreement was 
negotiated in 1911 the delegates sent to negotiate the agreement 
were from Canada. Great Britain did not appear at the hearings or 
conferences at all, and in every sense Canada was just as autono- 
mous in conducting her international negotiations as she would have 
been if she had been an absolutely independent Government. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 45 

The President. Yes; but this, you see, Senator, is a combination 
of definite Governments that have definite international relations 
with each other. 

Senator Knox. But the fact that you give representation to Canada 
and Australia and New Zealand and other autonomous self-governing- 
British colonies rather contradicts the idea, does it not, that they are 
one Governrnent? 

The President. I think not, sir; because in making up the con- 
stitution of the council it was provided, to speak with technical 
accuracy, that the five prmcipal allied or associated Governments 
should each have one representative in the league ; and in the opening 
paragraph of the treaty itself those powers are enumerated, and 
among others is the British Empire. "The Empire of Great Britain," 
I think, is the technical term. Therefore their unity is esta})lished 
by their representation in the council. 

Senator Brandegee. Mr. President, I read from the treaty ■ 

Tlie Chairman. I was going to ask, if I may, what function do 
these five Dominions of the British Empire have in the assembly ? 

Tlie President. None, except the general powers of the assembly 
itself. 

The Chairman. Tirey have votes in the assembly ? 

The President. They have votes, but in a matter involving the 
British Empire, they would have but one vote among them. 

The Chairman. But on all other matters, they would each have 
one vote ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. I want to call the President's attention to 
the first page of the treaty with Germany, which says, after the 
preamble setting forth the desirability of the condition existing 
being replaced by a just and durable peace, "For this purpose, the 
high contracting parties represented as follows," and then it names 
them, and in the list is "His Majesty, the King of the United King- 
dom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the British Dominions 
beyond the seas. Emperor of India, by his duly accredited officials, 
and the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
Dominion of South xlfrica, the Dominion of New Zealand," etc. Now, 
they are "high contracting parties"? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. And if one of those high contracting parties 
has a dispute with another of the high contracting parties, by what 
inference are other high contracting parties made parties to the 
dispute ? 

The President. I think by the inference that I thought I estab- 
lished, sir 

Senator Brandegee. But, if you will allow me to say so, it does 
not say that these parties, the self-governing British colonies, shall 
be excluded from participating in the deliberations because they 
may have some interest in the controversy. 

The President. No. 

Senator Brandegee. They must be parties to the dispute. Now, 
if we have a dispute with England about the right of an American 
ship to enter an English port, how can it be said that New Zealand 
or Australia is a party to that dispute? 



46 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

The President. Because, Senator, in case of the worst coming to 
the worst, and war ensuing, we would be at war with all of them. 

Senator Brandegee. It may be that a blunder has been made in 
creating such a situation. It would not be determinative, in my 
opinion. 

Now, on page 7 of the print that I have, which is Senate Document 
No. 49, Sixty-sixth Congress, first session, the last thing in the treaty 
is this statement: 

From the coming into force of the present treaty the state of -war will terminate. 
From that moment and subject to the provisions of this treaty, official relations with 
Germany, and with any of the German States, will be resumed by the allied and 
associated powers. 

The treaty itself provides that when Germany and three of the 
allied and associated powers have ratified the treaty it has come 
into force. 

The President. As between those parties. 

Senator Brandegee. It does not say so. 

The President. I beg your pardon, I think it does. 

Senator Brandegee. Here it is, Mr. President. [Handing pamphlet 
to the President.] I have read it, and there is no such language in 
it that I can discover. 

The President. No; not the part that you read; I did not mean 
that; but in the part where the provision is referred to about ratifi- 
cation by Germany and three of the principal allied and associated 
powers. 

vSenator Brandegee. I have read that with some care, and I have 
not seen it. 

Senator Knox. The language to which the President refers is the 
concluding paragraph of the treaty, and it provides that when the 
process of ratification shall have been completed by Germany and 
any three powers, the treaty shall come into force. 

The President. As between them. 

Senator Knox. No; I beg your pardon, Mr. President. In a sub- 
sequent clause dealing with what I think is an entirely different 
matter — that is, the adjustments as between the nations, not adjust- 
ments as between the allied and associated powers and Germany — ;it 
comes into force whenever the ratifications are made; but if you will 
take the body of the treaty you will find that everything that Germany 
is to do is to be done within a certain number of days after the rati- 
fication has been made; and a certain number of months afterwards 
she is to demobilize, give up her ships, and do aU things that will 
make her practically a noncombatant, within a number of days after 
ratification by three of the powers ; so she is either at peace with the 
world, or she is only partially at peace with the world; and as the 
requirements of the treaty are specific that she is to go out of the war 
business altogether, there is a conclusive inference in my mind that 
she is at peace with the world when those three ratifications have 
been made. 

The President. I can not agree with you there. You see, the 
theory is this : That when three of the principal allied and associated 
powers ratify this treaty, Germany having ratified it, then the treaty 
is in force; that is to say, she has then engaged to do the things 
provided in the treaty, and her engagement is with those three 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 47 

powers, among the rest, and she must then proceed to do what she has 
promised; but it does not estabhsh peace between her and other 
countries. 

Senator Knox. I think that language shows that it estabhshes 
peace and provides for a resumption of diplomatic and all other 
relations with Germany. I intend, within a short time, to try to 
make my views upon that clear. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. I went into that question rather thoroughly — 
''from the coming into force of the present treaty the state of war 
will terminate." Then it says, "From that moment, and subject 
to the provisions of this treaty, official relations with Germany and 
with any of the German States will be resumed by the allied and 
associated powers," which I assume means all of them. 

Now, to revert to another point, Mr. President, have you any 
knowledge— and I ask all these questions, of course, subject to your 
determination as to whether it is proper for you to answer them, or to 
make any statement about them • 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Are th^ Austrian, Bulgarian, and Turkish 
treaties, which I assume are in process of being made — — 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee (continuing). Intertwined with the covenant 
of the league of nations as is the treaty with Germany ? 

The President. The covenant of the league constitutes a part of 
each of those treaties. 

Senator Brandegee. Would you feel at liberty to state what per- 
centage of progress they have made up to the present time, or how 
nearly completed they are ? 

The President. I think they are all practically completed. Sena- 
tor, WTth the exception of some debatable ciuestions of territorial 
boundaries. 

Senator Brandegee. Inasmuch as our Constitution provides that 
treaties shall be made by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, do you think that it is 
constitutional for us to approve the Franco- American treaty which 
provides that before it goes into operation — or substantially, I would 
say, before it goes into operation — it must secure the approval of the 
council of the league of nations? 

The President. Why, yes; we can consent. We have the sover- 
eign right to consent to any process that we choose, surely. 

Senator Brandegee. We have the right to consent, but of course 
the Senate has the constitutional right to ratify the treaty, negotiated 
and presented by the Executive; but my point is, have we a right to 
provide that in addition to the constitutional requirements for the 
making of a valid treaty there shall also be required the consent of 
the council of the league of nations, which the Constitution was not 
aware of ? 

The President. If that is a part of the treaty; yes, I think we 
have. 

Senator Brandegee. But you do not think that the treaty can in 
any way amend the Constitution or the constitutional requirements 
for executing a treaty. 

The President. No. 



48 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Brandegee. Then by what process of ratiocination do you 
assume that the treaty can compel the consent of the council before 
this covenant is approved ? 

The President. Suppose you would determine that when any 
■ group of nations adopted a treaty then we could adopt the treaty that 
contained certain provisions that we wished to put in, and to make 
the operation of tne treaty contingent upon its acceptance by the 
other nations in the group. It seems to me that that is an entirel}'^ 
analogous case. In other words I am assuming that we adopt the 
treaty with Germany. In that case we will be members of the league. 
We are in effect saying that we have become members of the league. 
If the council of the league accepts this we agree to ])ut it in force. 
It is a means of being consistent with the thing that we have already 
done in becoming a member of the league. 

Senator Brandegee. I get your viewpoint about that. Now, do 
you think it is wise for us to adopt the Franco-American treaty which 
in substance provides that we can not denounce it until the council 
of the league of nations gives us permission to do so or agrees to 
denounce it. 

The President. I do, Senator. I have a very strong feeling with 
regard to our historical relations with France, and also a very keen 
appreciation of her own sense of danger, and I think it would be one 
of the handsomest acts of history to enter into that. 

Senator Brandegee. I feel just as cordially toward her heroic 
conduct as anybody can. But that was not the question. The 
question was whether it was wise to so tie ourselves to any foreign 
nation as that we never could repudiate — I will not use the word 
"repudiate" — can never cancel our treaties without due notice, 
without the consent of a body not yet created. 

The President. Of course I am assuming that body will be cre- 
ated before we adopt the Franco-American treaty, and in that case 
that provision that you are alluding to is only a completion of the 
idea of the treaty, namely, as I have been quoted as saying, this is 
an agreement on our part to anticipate the advice of the council of 
the league, as we shall take such and such measures to defend 
France. Inasmuch as we are anticipating that, we are assuming 
the action of the league, and therefore it is with the league and its 
action that the whole matter is bound up, and I think that the pro- 
vision you allude to, therefore, is consistent and almost logically 
necessary. 

Senator Brandegee. Well, now, inasmuch as you have stated in 
your message — and I have of course agreed to it and have no doubt 
that it is true — that the Franco-American treaty is only designed for 
temporary purposes, the defense of France until the league sa3^s that 
it is competent to do it, or words to that effect 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Would it not be the part of prudence for us 
to include in the Franco-American treaty, if it shoidd be ratified, a 
provision that it shall have some time limit put upon it, that it shall 
exist for not more than 10 years, say. I assume if the league is ever 
going to be effective to preserve the territorial integrity and political 
independence of its various members, it will be in the course of 10 
years, and there is no objection to having some time limit on the 
treaty. 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 40 

The President. Only a psychological objection, the sentiment be- 
tween the two countries. 

Senator Brandegee. The other alternative is to guarantee it for- 
ever or until the council of the league loosens us from it, is it not ? 

The President. Yes; when the council of the league will exist, 
among other uses should be that the whole international influence 
that could be broughc to bear for the management of all these things 
will be present there to bring about this rearrangement. 

Senator Brandegee. les; I understand that^ But the fact that 
we have a vote to loose ourselves does not help us, as unanimous 
action is required by nine gentlemen, any one of whom can prevent us. 

The President. No, Senator; but the diplomatic relations of the 
different countries in that council will be such, if I may judge, that 
those things may be accomplislied. 

Senator Brandegee. That is an optimistic view to take, if you 
will pardon my opinion about it. 

The President. Perhaps it is. 

Senator Brandegee. I want to call your attention to the fact 
that this era of good feeling which exists between the allied and 
associated powers after their common experience and suffering in 
this great war may not always exist, in view of future commercial 
contests and separate interests of different nationalities which may 
occur in the future, and what some of us feel is that we ought to be 
careful in making these definite international engagements, which we 
are wisely determined to carry out in good faith if we should make 
them, and we feel that now is the time to understand exactly the 
obligations we are to be held to before we affix our signature, and I 
have no doubt that you agree to that. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. I want to ask you a word or two about this 
so-called American draft. The xVmerican draft of the league which 
was sent to us in response to Senate resolution was the draft which 
was submitted by the American commission to the conference abroad ? 

The President. No. 

Senator Brandegee. It was the draft which was submitted by 
you as the head of the American commission to the American com- 
mission. Is that correct? 

The President. Why, Senator, it was clone as all other things of 
this sort were done over there. We circulated the draft among the 
representatives of the 14 States who were represented in the general 
league of nations, and they had 10 days or more to examine it. I 
also submitted it to my colleagues, not for any formal discussion 
but in order to have their opinion if they chose to express it. Then 
when the commission got down to its real work the}^ appointed a 
committee. 

Senator Brandegee. Of the commission? 

The President. No; of two officers of the commission. Well, 
they did form a committee, but that committee emplo3'ed the serv- 
ices of two technical advisers. Mr. Miller was one of them and 
Mr. Hurst — not the Mr. Hurst that Mr. Miller mentioned. 

Senator Brandegee. He gave his initials as C. J. B, 

The President. I have forgotten the initials. 



50 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Brandegee. He said he was an employee of the British 
State Department. 

The President. Yes; he is a very able man. He was on the gen- 
eral drafting committee of the treaty, and Mr. Miller took the various 
documents that we have been reading and discussing and made a com- 
bined draft and it was that combined draft which was the subject of 
formal discussion and amendment and addition by the committee. 

vSenator Brandegee. And that was the combined draft, the one 
that you sent to us the other day ? 

The President. No; Secretary Lansing was asked for it. 

The Chairman. It was a composite draft. It came in yesterday. 

Senator Brandegee. I beg your pardon, I did not know about 
it. Was there any draft, no matter how incomplete, any skeleton 
draft or enumeration or substance for a draft for the so-called 
American plan for the covenant of the league of nations which you 
took with you from this country or was prepared over there by you ? 

The President. Only the one that I referred to earlier in this 
conference. Senator, when I had taken the Phillimore report as more 
or less of a basis of my work. 

Senator Brandegee. That was the only thing that you had in 
the nature of a skeleton draft when you left the country ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. Did the Phillimore draft or report, whatever 
the proper term may be, contain anything like what is now article 10 
of the covenant of the league? 

The President. I do not remember. 

Senator Brandegee. You do not remember whether there was 
anything like that in that ? 

The President. Let me say this in regard to article 10. I believe 
this to be a part of the history of it. It is so far as I am concerned. 
Early in my administration, as I think many of the members know, 
I tried to get the American States, the States of Central and South 
America, to join with us in an arrangement in which a phrase like 
this constituted the kernel, that we guaranteed to each other terri- 
torial integrity and political independence. ''Under a republican 
form of government" was added in that case. But that is another 
matter. As I represented to them at that time, it was a desire on 
my part at any rate to show the way to them of keeping things steady 
and preventing the kind of aggression they have had. 

The Chairman. That was the subject of the Niagara conference ? 

Senator Brandegee. The A. B. C. powers. 

The President. I do not think it was discussed there, Senator. 
We discussed it diplomatically. 

The Chairman. It was taken up at that time ? 

The President. It was taken up at that time. 

Senator Brandegee. Who was the author of article 10? 

The President. I suppose I was as much as anybody. 

Senator Brandegee. And you recommended it to your fellow 
American commissioners ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Brandegee. How many Americans were on the commis- 
sion which framed the covenant for theleague of nations? 

The President. Two — Col. House and myself. 

Senator Brandegee. The total membership was what? Fifteen, 
was it not ? 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 51 

The President. Fourteen nations, and five principal nations 
had two members, which would make 19, would it not? Yes, 19 
members. 

Senator Brandegee. Did they have the unit rule, so to speak, 
casting one vote for each member ? 

The President. In only one or two instances did we vote at all. 
I presided and the final form was this, ''If there are no objections we 
will regard that as accepted." 

Senator Brandegee. As we say in the Senate, "without objec- 
tion it is agreed to." 

The President. Yes; and that is the way the whole thing was 
agreed to. 

Senator Brandegee. Did these commissions to which the plenary 
conference delegated certain subjects to prepare reports upon have 
any coordination with each other? Did each commission know 
what the other commissions were doing ? 

The President. No; the subjects were too unlike. 

Senator Brandegee. Was there any debate on the completed 
draft of the covenant of the league of nations when it was submitted 
to the plenary council just before you came over in March ? 

The President. Yes; there were speeches. 

Senator Brandegee. I do not call those debates. I read that 
there were no debates as to what each particular government de- 
manded. 

The President. No; because there were so many of those rep- 
resented, and they had all been canvassed in the process of formu- 
lation. 

Senator Brandegee. You replied to a resolution of the Senate 
requesting a copy of a letter of Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, which was 
also signed by Secretary Lansing 

The President. And Mr. White. 

Senator Brandegee. And Mr. White — you stated, if I recollect, 
in substance, that you would be glad to furnish us with a copy of it 
but for the fact that Gen. Bliss had mentioned the names of certain 
Governments and you thought it was a matter of delicacy not to 
make it public. Would it not be possible to furnish us with the 
general drift of the arguments, leaving out the names of the Govern- 
ments, etc. ? 

The President. There was not any argument. He said flatly 
that it was unjust. It was not a reason. 

Senator Brandegee. It was an opinion. 

The President. An opinion. 

Senator Brandegee. A conclusion. 

Senator Johnson of California. With that, you agreed, Mr. Presi- 
dent, did you not ? 

The President. Senator, I do not think I ought to say any more 
than I have said. 

Senator Brandegee. I do not think I care to ask anything more. 

Senator Hitchcock. Will you permit me to read into the record 
these two paragraphs from the conclusion of the treaty and ask 
whether they are what you refer to when you express the opinion 
that the treaty would go into effect when Germany and three of the 
contracting parties had signed it, and only as to them ? 

The Chairman. 'That is explicitly stated. 



52 TEEATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Hitchcock. I thought it was left in some doubt. I would 
like to read them into the record [reading]: 

A first procfes-verbal of the deposit of ratifications will be drawn up as soon as the 
treaty has been ratified by Germany on the one hand, and by three of the principal 
allied and associated powers on the other hand. 

From the date of this first proces- verbal the treaty will come into force between the 
high contracting parties who have ratified it. For the determination of all periods of 
time provided for in the present treaty this date will be the date of the coming into 
force of the treaty. 

I just wanted to make it clear that the treaty is not in effect 
except as to those that have ratified it. 

The President. I could not put my hand on it, but I was sure. 

Senator McCumber. Mr. President, just one question on this 
French treaty. If we should adopt this present treaty with the 
league of nations and with section 10 in it, which brings all of the 
great nations of the league to the protection of France, if war should 
be made against her by Germany, what necessity is there for any 
other special treaty with France ? 

The President. To meet the possibility of delay in action on the 
part of the council of the league. 

Senator McCumber. But the agreement of section 10 comes into 
effect, does it not, the moment we adopt the treaty? 

The President. Yes; but the council has to act and formulate 
its advice, and then the several Governments have to act and form 
their judgment upon that advice. 

Senator McCumber. Do you not think under the present situation 
that that could be done as quickly as Germany could get ready for 
a second war on France ? 

The President. Oh, as quickly as she could get ready, yes; but 
not as quickly as she could act after she got ready. 

Senator Brandegee. Mr. President, the situation is this: If Ger- 
many has surrendered her navy, demobilized her army, and been 
shorn of large portions of her territory; if we have no demand for rep- 
aration or indemnity against her; if, as you stated in your addresses 
to the Congress, the war is over; if there is no fighting going on; if 
Germany has signed the peace treaty, and you have signed the peace 
treaty; if, in fact, there is a condition of peace, and only the joint 
resolution of Congress that a state of war existed a year ago — if that 
is aU so, is there no way by which the condition of peace which 
actually exists can be made legally effective except by the adoption 
of the proposed treaty? 

The President. Senator, I would say that there is no way which 
we ought to be willing to adopt which separates us, in dealing with 
Germany, from those with whom we were associated during the war. 

Senator Brandegee. Why? 

The President. Because I think that is a moral union which we 
are not at liberty to break. 

Senator Brandegee. If we have rescued our fellow belligerents 
from the German peril voluntarily and without any charge, and it 
we prefer not to have any entanglements or connections with Euro- 
pean powers, but to pursue our course as we did before the war, 
where is the moral obligation to merge ourselves with Europe forever ? 

The President. I do not construe it as merging ourselves, but I 
do think we are under the plainest moral obligation to join with our 
associates in imposing certain conditions of peace on Germany. 



TBEATY OF PEACE WITH GEKMANY. 53 

Senator Brandegee. Even if we ratify the German so-called peace 
treaty, with or without the Shantung provision in it, and strike out 
article 1_ of the peace treaty, the covenant of the league of nations, 
we still join with those with whom we have cooperated in establish- 
ing peace with Germany, do we not, and are at liberty to trade with 
her ? 

The President. An unworkable peace, because the league is neces- 
sary to the working of it. 

Senator Brandegee. Well, suppose they have a league, and w© 
ratify the treaty with the reservation that we are not bound by 
article 1, which is the covenant of the league — then they have a 
league of nations covenant. 

The President. Yes, and we are tied into every other part of the 
treaty by reason of the fact that we are supposed to be members of 
the league of nations. 

Senator Brandegee. Suppose we also adopt the 21 amendments 
that Senator Fall has pending before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, striking us out of these commissions to which we are tied, 
and just cutting the Gordian knot which ties us to the covenant: 
We establish peace with Germany just the same, I fancy. The other 
powers could accept our amendments to the treaty or not, as they 
chose. In either case Germany would be at peace, and they would 
be in the league, and we would be out of it. We could have peace, 
and resume all our business in relation to copper mines and zinc 
mines, etc., and we could export to Germany, and reestablish the 
consular service; could we not? 

The President. We could, sir; but I hope the people of the United 
States will never consent to do it. 

Senator Brandegee. There is no way by which the people can 
vote on it. 

The Chairman. Are we not trading with Germany now, as a matter 
of fact ? 

Tlie President. Not so far as I know, sir. 

The Chairman. Licenses certainly have been issued. It is adver- 
tised in all the New York papers. 

The President. We removed the restrictions that were formerly 
placed upon shipments to neutral countries which we thought were 
going through to Germany. 

The Chairman. Yes; I see them advertised broadly in the New 
York papers. 

Senator Johnson of California. Mr. President, does the moral obli- 
gation to which you have alluded compel us to maintain American 
troops in Europe ? 

Tlie President. Which moral obligation. Senator? 

Senator Johnson of California. You referred to the moral obliga- 
tion resting upon us to carry out the peace terms and the like in con- 
junction with our associates, and felt that it would be, as I understood 
you, a breaking, a denial of that moral obligation to make a separate 
peace or to act b}^ ourselves. 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Johnson of California. Does that obligation go to the 
extent of compelling us to maintain American troops in Europe? 

The President. Such small bodies as are necessary to the carrying 
out of the treaty, I think; yes. 



54 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 

Senator Johnson of California. And will those troops have to be 
maintained under the various treaties of peace until the ultimate 
consummation of the terms of those treaties ? 

The President. Yes, Senator; but that is not long. In no case, 
as I remember, does that exceed 18 months. 

Senator Johnson of California. I was rather under the impression 
that the occupation of Germany was to be for 15 years. 

The President. Oh, I beg your pardon. 

The C'HAiRMAN. Along the Rhine. 

The President. Along the Rhine; yes. I was thinking of Upper 
Silesia, and the other places where plebiscites are created, or to be 
carried out. It is the understanding with the other Governments 
that we are to retain only enough troops there to keep our flag there. 

Senator Johnson of California. The idea in my mind was this: 
Will we be maintaining American troops upon the Rhine for the next 
1 5 years ? 

The President. That is entirely within our choice. Senator; but 
I suppose we will. 

Senator Johnson of California. Do you know, Mr. President, 
whether or not we have American troops in Budapest at present ? 

The President. We have not. There are some American officers 
there. Senator, sent with a militar}^ commission, but no American 
troops. 

Senator Johnson of California. Returning, if you do not mind, Mr. 
President, to one last question about Shantung, do you recall the 
American experts reporting that the Japanese promise, the verbal 
promise, which has been referred to, to return Shantung, meant in 
reality the returning of the shell but retaining the kernel of the nut ? 

The President. I remember their saying that; yes, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. That is all. 

The President. But I do not agree with them. 

Senator New. Mr. President, if no one else has any questions to 
ask, I have a few. 

The President. Proceed, Senator, if you will. 

Senator New. These questions, Mr. President, are more or less 
general and haphazard, referring to no particular feature of the 
treaty, but to all of them. 

First, was it the policy of the American delegates to avoid partici- 
pation by the United States in strictly European questions and their 
settlement; and, if so, what were the matters in which America 
refused to participate, or endeavored to avoid participation? 

The President. I could not give you a list in answer to the last 
part of your question, sir; but it certainly was our endeavor to keep 
free from European affairs. 

Senator New. What did the American delegates say or do to secure 
nonparticipation by the United States in the cessions of Danzig, 
Memel, and in the various boundary commissions, reparations com- 
missions, and other agencies set up in the treaty for the disposition 
of questions in which America has no national interest ? 

The President . I did not get that. Senator, it is so long. 

Senator New. I will divide it. What did the American delegates 
say or do to secure nonparticipation by the United States in the 
cessions of Danzig and Memel ? 

The President. Why, Senator, the process of the whole peace was 
this: Each nation had associated with it certam expert advisers, 



TREATY OF PEACE WITH GERMANY. 55 

college professors and bankers and men who were familiar with 
ethnical and geographical and financial and business questions. 
Each question was referred to a joint commission consisting of the 
specialists in that field representing the principal allied and associated 
powers. Tliey made a report to this smaller council, and in every 
instance the American representatives were under instilictions to 
keep out of actual participation in these processes so far as it was 
honorably possible to do so. 

vSenator New. The second half of the question is this: What did 
the Anierican delegates do to secure nonparticipation by the United 
States in the reparations commission? 

The President. Why, we were disinclined to join in that, but 
yielded to the urgent request of the other nations that we should, 
because they wanted our advice and counsel. 

Senator New. What agreement, written or verbal, has been 
entered into by the American delegates touching the assignment to 
various States of mandatories under the provisions of article 22 ? 

The President. None whatever. 

Senator New. If it be understood that Great Britain or her 
dominions will act as mandatories of the territory in Africa lately 
held by Germany, what advantage of a practical nature is expected 
to accrue, and whom will it benefit, from subjecting the British or 
dominion administration to the mandatories of such nations as 
Liberia, Italy, or any others ? 

The President. Mandatories of Liberia ? 

Senator New. Yes. 

The President. I do not understand, Senator. The whole system 
of mandates is intended for the development and protection of the 
territories to which they apply — that is to say, to protect their 
inhabitants, to assist their development under the operation of the 
opinion of the world, and to lead to their ultimate independent 
existence. 

Senator New. Mr. President, it seems that there is more than a 
suspicion: there is a general conviction in the world, I think, that 
Germany is promoting the dissemination of Bolshevist propaganda 
in the countries of the Allies, including the United States. That 
being the case, I am prompted to ask what provision in the treaty 
obligates German}^ to prohibit Bolshevik propaganda from German 
sources in the United States and allied countries? 

The President. None. 

Senator New. No provision ? Was any proposal considered by 
the peace conference directed toward securing the names of German 
propaganda agents in the United States and the allied countries, or 
to obtain the records of the disbursements made in support of 
Bolshevik or other propaganda intended to weaken or disrupt the 
United States? 

The President. We made every effort to trace everything that we 
got rumor of, Senator; and traced everything that we could; but no 
provisions were feasible in the treaty itself touching that. 

Senator New. Did not France yield under pressure at least partly 
exerted by the American delegates to abandon certain guaranties of 
the security of her German frontiers which she had been advised by 
Marshal Foch were indispensable; and is not the present frontier, in 
French military opinion, less secure than the one which France was 
induced to abandon? 



a 



56 TREATY OF PEACE WITH GEEMANY. 

The President. Senator, do you think I ought to redebate here 
the fundamental questions that we debated at Paris ? I think that 
would be a mistake, sir. 

Senator Johnson of California. Mr. President, it is on that very 
theory that I refrained from asking many of those things, the thoughts 
of which crowd one's mind, and which one would like to ask. 

The President. Of course. You see, you are going into the method 
by which the treaty was negotiated. Now, with all respect, sir, I 
think that is a territory that we ought not to enter. 

Senator New. Of course, if there is any reason why it should not 
be answered, I will withdraw it. Is there objection to answering ' 
this, Mr. President: What was France's solution proposed for admin- | 
istration of the Saar Basin? h! 

The President. I do not think I ought to answer those c|uestions, § 
Senator, because of course they affect the policy and urgency of -j 
other Governments. I am not at liberty to go into that. ; 

Senator New. Mr. President, would our position in the War of 1812 jj 
and the Spanish-American War have been secure under the league ]i 
covenant ? 5j 

The President. Oh, Senator, you can judge of that as well as I || 
could, I have tried to be a historical student, but I could not quite |^ 
get the league back into those da3^s clearly enough in my mind to form [ 
a judgment. I 

Senator New. What would have been the procedure under the i'\ 
covenant in those two cases, in your opinion ? ": 

The President. Why, Senator, I could figure that out if 3^ou gave g; 
me half a day, because I would have to refresh m.}- mind as to the '^: 
circumstances that brought on the wars ; but that has not been jji; 
regarded as a profitable historical exercise — ^hypotheticallj^- to recon- |; 
struct history. |: 

Senator New. Well, I do not want to press for answers, then. ' ^ 

Senator Moses. Mr. President, under the terms of the treaty, f. 
Germany cedes to the principal allied and associated powers all of ?ii 
her overseas possessions ? 

The President. Yes. 

Senator Moses. We thereby, as I view it, become possessed in fee 
of an undivided fifth part of those possessions. 

The President. Only as one of five trustees. Senator. There is 
no thought in any mind of sovereignty. 

Senator Moses. Such possession as we acquire by means of that 
cession would have to be disposed of by congressional action. 

The President. I have not thought about that at all. 

Senator Moses. You have no plan to suggest or recommendation to 
make to Congress ? . 

The President. Not yet, sir; I am waiting until the treatj^ is dis- , 
posed of. 

The Chairman. Mr. President, I do not wish to interfere in any .; 
way, but the conference has now lasted about three hours and a half, 
and it is half an hoiu* after the lunch hour. 

The President. Will not you gentlemen take luncheon with me ? 
It will be very delightful. 

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock and 35 minutes p. m., the conference ad- 
journed.) 

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